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Chapter 1  
Practical Guidance and Virtue Ethics 
One prominent objection to neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics asserts that virtue ethics 
cannot provide agents guidance about what to do.  Because virtue ethics is distinguished 
from other ethical theories by its focus on agent-level evaluation and emphasis on 
developed discernment and deliberation about ends, it is in tension with the aim of 
developing an effective system of codified action guidance.1  Yet if we think that at root, 
ethical theory is a practical endeavor aimed at articulating codified act-level responses to 
questions like ‘what should I do?’ or ‘how should one live?’ by failing to offer 
substantive practical guidance accessible to ordinary agents, virtue ethics risks failing to 
meet standard expectations of normative ethical theory.2 
I argue that this objection is vague and can support a variety of specific claims 
against virtue ethics.  Further, these claims divide into three basic versions, only one of 
which poses a genuine challenge to virtue ethics.  One version of the objection suggests 
                                                 
1
 Louden, R.  “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics” in Virtue Ethics, Crisp, R. and M. Slote, 
eds.  Oxford University Press:  Oxford.  1997.  Pp. 201-216. Driver, J.  “Virtue Theory” 
in Contemporary Debates in Moral Philosophy pp. 113-123.  Driver, J.  “Normative 
Ethics” in Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. pp31-62. 
Hursthouse, R.  “Are Virtues the Proper Starting Point for Morality?”  In Contemporary 
Debates in Moral Philosophy pp. 99-112.  Hursthouse, R.  “Applying Virtue Ethics” in 
Virtues and Reasons:  Philippa Foot and Moral Theory.  New York:  Clarendon Press. 
1995.  Pp. 57-75.  Hursthouse, R.  “Practical Wisdom:  A Mundane Account” in 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106, 285-309. pp. 285-309. 2006  Hursthouse, R.  
On Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press, 1999.  Solomon, D.  “Internal Objections to 
Virtue Ethics”  in Statman, D.  Virtue Ethics:  A Critical Reader, 1997.  Pp. 165-179. 
Annas, J.  “Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing,” in Proceedings of the Pacific 
Division of APA.  Pp. 61-75. 
 
2Kagan, Shelley.  Normative Ethics.  Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1998. 
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that in order to adequately guide, an ethical theory needs to offer codified guidance or 
some sort of decision-making procedure for guidance.  A second version of the objection 
suggests that ethical theories need to provide models of guidance or heuristics for agents 
in order to guide.  Yet this first claim proves unduly stringent as an expectation of ethical 
theory, and the second fails to challenge virtue ethics because it expects something any 
theory can readily provide.   
A third version of the practical guidance objection, however, challenges virtue 
ethics by claiming that virtue ethics fails to provide guidance that ordinary or untrained 
agents can use to realize virtue.  I argue that this third version poses a reasonable 
challenge that virtue ethics needs to answer.  Without this sort of guidance, it is unclear 
that the view is applicable, meets the aims of an ethical theory more broadly, and offers 
significant advantages over Kantian or Utilitarian accounts that provide agents with 
readily accessible principles or action guidance rules.  
Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics3 
 A primary target of the practical guidance critique, neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, 
aims to answer the question, “how should one live?” neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics 
echoes the answer sketched by Aristotle, focusing on developing good character with the 
                                                 
 
3
 Here, I follow the advice of M. Nussbaum in , “Virtue Ethics:  A Misleading 
Category?”  in The Journal of Ethics, 3:  163-201, 1999.  To distinguish the type of virtue 
ethics I address here from other types of virtue ethics, I use the term, “Neo-Aristotelian 
Virtue Ethics” instead of “Virtue Ethics.”  However, because the only type of virtue 
ethics I am concerned with here is Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics my use of “virtue 
ethics” will refer to “Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics” throughout unless otherwise 
specified. 
 3
aim of flourishing as a being of one’s kind.4  In contrast to views that more directly 
address the question of right action and develop a small set of principles that can be used 
to guide action in accordance with the aims of the views, virtue ethics maintains both the 
explanatory primacy of virtue and require practical wisdom as a non-reducible 
requirement of living well.5  The primary aim of ethical reflection on a neo-Aristotleian 
virtue ethics is not, “the concept of right conduct, and the nature and justification of 
principles of behaviour,”6 but instead the life one leads and the type of person one is.  
Actions are critical for developing good character and exhibiting virtue on a neo-
Aristotelian virtue account, yet the central question of how one should live, “is 
necessarily approached via the notion of a virtuous person.”7   
Right action involves an agent acting consistently in the right way, for the right 
reasons, with the right emotional response, and from the reasons she believes are right.8 
                                                 
 
4
 Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. On Virtue Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.  P. 
167. 
 
5
 Pages 451-452 from:  Watson, G.  “On the Primacy of Character” in Identity, 
Character, and Morality:  Essays in Moral Psychology.  Cambridge:  MIT press, 
1990.  Pp. 449-469. See also, Solomon, David.  1997.  “Internal Objections to 
Virtue Ethics” in Virtue Ethics.  Daniel Statman, editor.  Edinburgh:  Edinburgh 
University Press.  Pp. 165-179.  p. 166; Watson, Gary. 1990. “On the Primacy of 
Character” in Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology. 
Edited by Flanagan, Owen J., and Amélie Rorty.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Pp. 
451. 
 
6
 McDowell, “Virtue and Reason,” in Virtue Ethics.  Crisp, R. and M. Slote, eds. P. 141. 
 
7
 Ibid. p. 141. 
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In contrast to act-oriented views that provide a right-making account of action, virtue 
ethics provides a conceptual framework for deliberation.9  Even though good action is an 
indispensable feature of good character, the evaluative criteria on a neo-Aristotelian 
virtue view are worked out in agent-level terms. 10 
As a result, virtue ethics lacks a straightforward, simple distillation of right action 
that can be articulated in a small set of principles or as strict, non-defeasible act 
prohibitions.  Instead, neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics follows Aristotle, who, 
sees our lives as full of different obligations, interests, and commitments, 
and as requiring from us many immediate reactions to immediate 
circumstances.  This by and large is the nature of a human life, and his 
idea is that we live such a life well, i.e., for him, mainly in terms of the 
virtues moralistically conceived.11   
                                                                                                                                                 
8
 1144b26-28, Broadie S. p. 353 from Broadie, S.  “Aristotle and Contemporary Ethics” 
in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  Malden MA:  Blackwell 
Publishing.  2006.  342-360. 
 
9Wiggins, D.  “Deliberation and Practical Reason” in Needs, Values, Truth.  pp. 221-240. 
Page 237. 
 
10
 In “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Anscombe points out that “virtues and vices are built 
up by performance of the actions in which they are instanced, and an act of injustice will 
tend to make a man bad.” P. 43 [reprinted in Virtue Ethics, Crisp, R. and M. Slote, 
Oxford University Press:  Oxford, 1997.] 
In NE, Aristotle claims that, “states arise out of like activities.  This is why the activities 
we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states correspond to the differences 
between these.” 1103b21-23, (see also 1103b30-31). 
 
11
 Broadie, Sarah.  2006.  “Aristotle and Contemporary Ethics,” in The Blackwell Guide 
to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Blackwell Guides to Great Works, vol. 4. Edited by 
Richard Kraut.  Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.  Pp. 342-361. p. 352.  The 
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The many and varied features and aims involved in one’s practical reasoning precludes 
reducing the value of each feature to a single commensurable quality or developing a list 
of categorically binding duties agents can consult for a definitive answer to the question 
of what action to do.  Even if the consequences of action and requirements of duty 
minimally constrain one’s act choices, deliberation about action involves considering 
one’s options in light of one’s own set of commitments, proclivities, and individual 
circumstances.12  The uniqueness of each persons’ set of commitments, in combination 
with the particular combination of features a situation presents, affect decisions about 
what to do, and leaves neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics without a principled code to provide 
agents substantive practical guidance for concrete situations. 
In place of a principled action guidance code, virtue ethics emphasizes the role of 
practical wisdom,13 which requires an agent have the ability to,  
 select from the infinite number of features of a situation those features that 
bear upon the notion or ideal of existence which it is his standing aim to 
make real.  This conception of human life results in various evaluations of 
all kinds of things, in various sorts of cares and concerns, and in various 
projects.14 
                                                                                                                                                 
point Broadie makes about Aristotle as viewing human life as involving a variety of 
obligations and commitments is also made by B.A.O. Williams, E. Pincoffs, and others. 
 
12
 Pincoffs, E.  “Quandary Ethics” in Mind, v.80, n. 320. (Oct 1971), pp. 552-571. 
 
13
 Further, Aristotle states that, “Practical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state 
of capacity to act with regard to human goods.” [1140b1 20, 21] 
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Although some sorts of generalizations are undoubtedly true, the role of practical wisdom 
in virtue ethics emphasizes the importance of an agent’s own evaluation of aims in 
deliberation, and precludes developing a simple hierarchy of principles.15  Although 
integral to neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, this resistance to codification gives the practical 
guidance critique purchase. 
The Practical Guidance Critique of Virtue Ethics 
A common critique of contemporary virtue ethics claims that virtue ethics is 
unable to provide agents with adequate practical guidance.   In general form, this 
criticism of virtue ethics endorses the claim that the moral contextualism and 
corresponding non-codification that virtue ethics endorses, precludes it from providing 
adequate action guidance to agents.  Roughly, the worry is that, “it is in the very nature of 
an EV [ethics of virtue] that it cannot provide the kind of determinate guidance for action 
                                                                                                                                                 
14
 Wiggins, David. 1998. “Deliberation and Practical Reason,” in Needs, Values, Truth: 
Essays in the Philosophy of Value. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  Pp. 215-239.  p. 
236.  Nussbaum, Martha C. 1990. “The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian 
Conception of Private and Public Rationality” in Love's Knowledge: Essays on 
Philosophy and Literature. New York: Oxford University Press.  Pp. 54-105. p. 71. 
 
15
 In EN VI, Aristotle claims that “it is thought to be a mark of a man of practical wisdom 
to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some 
particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or strength, but about 
what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general.  [1140a1 25-29]. 
See Nussbaum, Martha C. 1990. “The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian 
Conception of Private and Public Rationality” in Love's Knowledge: Essays on 
Philosophy and Literature. New York: Oxford University Press.  Pp. 54-105.   Watson, 
453, point 1 in section 6.  See also Millgram, E.  “Murdoch, Practical Reasoning, and 
Particularism” in Ethics Done Right Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  2005.  Pp. 
168-197. 
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that is required in an adequate normative ethics.”16  This view seems plausibly founded 
on two main assumptions:  (1) moral theory ultimately aims to influence action, and,  (2) 
to affect action, a theory needs to develop an adequate method of action guidance.  If 
these two main assumptions are well-founded, and virtue ethics’ resistance to codification 
leaves it unable to meet these expectations, the practical guidance critique threatens to 
undermine the legitimacy of virtue ethics. 
Although a common concern among both critics and proponents of virtue ethics, 
few articulations of the practical guidance critique develop clear justifications of the 
concern.  One of the clearest and most thoroughly reasoned articulations of the challenge 
is voiced by Robert Louden in, “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics.”  Louden’s articulation 
of the practical guidance objection to virtue ethics suggests that virtue ethics fails to meet 
a primary aim of ethical theory because the means of guidance offered on virtue ethics 
accounts lack the codification and directness conducive to providing agents with action 
guidance.17 
The basic concern articulated by the practical guidance critique claims that, by 
failing to provide codified or direct forms of action guidance of the appropriate sort, 
virtue ethics fails to meet a common and important expectation of ethics.  Louden claims 
                                                 
 
16
 Solomon, David.  1997.  “Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics” in Virtue Ethics.  
Daniel Statman, editor.  Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press.  Pp. 165-179.  p. 170.  
Note that the version of the practical guidance critique discussed in this section is the 
more general version of the objection. 
 
17
 Louden, R.  “Some Vices of Virtue Ethics”, in Virtue Ethics, edited by Crisp, R. and 
M. Slote.  Oxford University Press, 1997.  Pp. 201-216. 
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that, “people have always expected ethical theory to tell them something about what they 
ought to do[.]”18  This expectation for practical import is not only a tangential expectation 
that would improve a view on balance.  Instead it is a core purpose for which we engage 
in ethical inquiry.  As George Sher explains, 
if the ultimate aim is to decide what to do, then ethics must at some deep 
level be oriented toward action. 
And this is significant because there is a strong case that ethics is 
at bottom practical.  Certainly many in both camps would agree that ethics 
originates in efforts to bring reason to bear on the primal and inescapable 
question of how to live.19  
It is not obvious that the adequacy of any single articulation of an ethical theory requires 
it speak directly to the issue of action guidance.20  However, if practical guidance were 
                                                 
 
18
 Louden, Robert B. 1997 “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics” in Virtue Ethics. Edited by 
Crisp, Roger and Michael A. Slote. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press.  Pp. 201-216.  P. 205. 
 
19
 Sher, G.  “Ethics, Character, and Action” in Virtue and Vice, Frankel Paul, E. and P. 
Frankel?  pp. 1-17.  Quotation from p. 16.  The “two camps” noted in the quotation are 
“virtue” and “duty” representing two different “basic evaluative concept[s]” for ethics.  
Sher, p. 1.  See also Leibowitz, U.  “Moral Advice and Moral Theory”, Smith, H.  
“Making Moral Decisions.” 
 
Solomon argues in this vein as well, claiming that, “Normative ethics is undoubtedly 
supposed to have a practical point,”  P. 169. Sher, “Ethics, Character, and Action”, p. 16  
See also Louden, Robert B. 1997 “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics” in Virtue Ethics. 
Edited by Crisp, Roger and Michael A. Slote. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press.  Pp. 201-216.   p. 210.  
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the main point of ethical inquiry, articulations of an ethical theory at least should be 
compatible with adequate guidance, at the risk of failing to fulfill the main purpose for 
which it was developed. 
Although there is quite a lot of variance among the specific claims being assumed 
and made among different articulations of the critique, the challenges commonly share 
two emphases.  One emphasis of the practical guidance critique is an expectation of 
codified guidance, some sort of principle-based theory articulating justification for 
actions; the other expectation often emphasized is direct guidance, guidance that can be 
applied with little recourse to moral judgment.  Although neither implies the other, very 
strong articulations of the practical guidance critique appear to expect both together, yet it 
is important to note that it is nearly impossible that a psychologically plausible practical 
system could include strong forms of both at once.  Yet, both expectations of codified 
guidance and direct guidance each seem at least prima facie well motivated as plausible 
standards of guidance.  
For example, the emphasis on codification comports with what Sarah Broadie 
calls, “[a] deeply entrenched modern assumption that a major, if not the central, task of 
philosophical ethics is to systematize the principles of ordinary personal conduct.”21  
                                                                                                                                                 
20
 Bales, R. E.  “Act-Utilitarianiams:  Account of Right-Making Characteristics or 
Decision-Making Procedure?”  American Philosophical Quarterly.  Volume 8, Number 
3, July 1971.  Pp. 257-265.  Point from p. 261. 
21
 Broadie, Sarah.  2006.  “Aristotle and Contemporary Ethics,” in The Blackwell Guide 
to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Blackwell Guides to Great Works, vol. 4. Edited by 
Richard Kraut.  Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.  Pp. 342-361.  p. 354.  
McDowell characterizes the modern approach in much the same way in “Virtue and 
Reason,” p.141. 
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Although Broadie does not endorse the Modern motivation to systematize 
generalizations, she does posit a plausible motivation for codification that might be used 
to justify the emphasis on codified guidance on the practical guidance critique.  The 
socio-historical context from when virtue ethics was first developed until now, has 
changed in ways that make codification much more important as a means of “equipping 
practical agents with what they now need for ethical intercommunication,” in what now 
are much more heterogeneous societies culturally than they were in Ancient Greece.22  
Further, if ethical theory is to have practical import, then it is plausible to expect it 
impose not only the same constraints on action universally, but also be accessible to a 
broad range of agents, suggesting that, as a means of communicating standards to a broad 
audience of agents, codification is a prima facie plausible expectation for theory.23 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lance and Little define what they call the “Enlightenment Model of Morality” in a 
similar way.  From Lance and Little, “Particularism and Antitheory”, p. 573. 
 
22
 Broadie, Sarah.  2006.  “Aristotle and Contemporary Ethics,” in The Blackwell Guide 
to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Blackwell Guides to Great Works, vol. 4. Edited by 
Richard Kraut.  Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.  Pp. 342-361.  p. 355. 
Louden, Robert B. 1997 “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics” in Virtue Ethics. Edited by 
Crisp, Roger and Michael A. Slote. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press.  Pp. 201-216.  On page 213 Louden makes a parallel point 
regarding the difference in socio-cultural context of contemporary virtue ethics and 
ancient ethics. 
 
23
 Louden’s primary concern is that, due to the focus on character-level assessment and 
“intention[al] down-playing [of] atomic acts and particular choice situations in the 
process,” virtue ethics are unable to offer a decision-making procedure, something at 
least tacitly considered a long-standing expectation of ethical theory.  Louden, 210.  
Quotation from Louden, Robert B. 1997 “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics” in Virtue 
Ethics. Edited by Crisp, Roger and Michael A. Slote. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.  Pp. 201-216. P. 204. 
 11
The directness challenge issued by the practical guidance critique cites the worry 
that, even if there is a sense in which virtue ethics could guide agents’ actions, the 
structure of virtue ethics conveys action guidance only indirectly.  As Louden claims, 
virtue ethics is unable to offer agents direct, concrete action guidance because it, “speaks 
of rules and principles of action only in a derivative manner.”  Because its evaluative 
terms are set at the character level instead of at the level of action, the guidance it can 
provide is too far removed from the question of guiding action that, “its derivative oughts 
are frequently too vague and unhelpful for persons who have not yet acquired the 
requisite moral insight and sensitivity.”24 Without a direct assessment of actions, as 
actions, and not as a subsidiary of character or flourishing, the reasoning goes, virtue 
ethics is not of practical use to anyone but the person already brought up to be sensitive 
to the right sorts of considerations including the right ends.  As a theory that relies 
heavily on one’s faculties of judgment to discern the relevant features of a situation to 
consider in deliberation, virtue ethics cannot offer agents the sort of situation-specific 
practical guidance that seems to be an important way to meeting the main aim of ethical 
inquiry.25 
 The main claim of the practical guidance critique, that virtue ethics lacks good 
practical guidance, is based in the expectations that theory have practical import, and 
                                                 
 
24
 Ibid, p. 206. Both this and quote in previous sentence. 
 
25
 For example, variability among actual actions that might count as virtuous in a 
particular situation that may, in some cases, conflict with the sorts of rules that typically 
are assumed to hold, such as Kantian perfect duties. 
 12
either codified and direct action-level guidance is indicative of adequate practical 
guidance.  Ultimately, if codified or direct practical guidance is required for adequacy as 
an ethical theory, and virtue ethics, by its nature, cannot provide it, then it does seem the 
practical guidance critique has purchase against virtue ethics and picks out a significant 
problem with the theory.  On the face of it, the concern is substantiated by the moral 
contextualism Neo Aristotelian virtue ethics requires and its incompatibility at least with 
priority of codified guidance in deliberation about action.26  
Contextualism and Uncodifiability 
Virtue ethics’ commitments to character-level evaluative aims and assessments 
lead to the common emphasis on the particular as justificatory in discerning relevant 
considerations and deliberating about action.  Regardless of the metaphysical 
underpinning, the moral contextualism required for applying the broader moral 
commitments of virtue ethics precludes developing a set of non-defeasible principles by 
which one could evaluate and plausibly also prescribe actions.27  Instead, the variety of 
                                                 
 
26
 E.g. Kagan, Chapter 1. Further, Solomon argues that each of the main objections 
against virtue ethics that are articulated from within ethics are equally problematic for 
consequentialist and deontological views if we consider the accounts in more than their 
most rudimentary forms. Solomon, David.  1997.  “Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics” 
in Virtue Ethics.  Daniel Statman, editor.  Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press.  Pp. 
165-179. 
 
27
 They distinguish between both ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’, and ‘deep’ and ‘surface’ 
contextualisms, committing to a broad and deep contextualism.  Broad contextualism 
holds that “many or all important principles turn out to be exception filled, and that 
valence-switching applies at the level of thick moral concepts.”  Deep moral 
contextualism holds that “exceptions go down to the explanatory ground:  there is no 
need to vindicate variation on the basis of exceptionless principles.” Both quotations 
 13
ethical considerations involved in discernment and deliberation render rules inadequate 
for action guidance.28  
In its strongest forms, moral contextualism is thoroughly antitheoretic, 
maintaining the notion that moral considerations have a certain fixed value, independent 
of context, misrepresents all but the most abstract claims.29  Particularism, a radical 
contextualism grounded metaphysically in holism of reasons, is often cited as the 
underlying source of the tension between virtue ethics and the practical guidance 
critique.30 However, moral contextualism embedded in an atomistic view of reasons is 
sufficient for rejecting the notion that a systematic theory of general, act-level guidance 
principles could be developed in an applicable way. 
More specifically, particularism expresses the view that, “there is reason to doubt 
the existence of any codifiable generalities linking moral and nonmoral properties,”31 and 
maintains much of the tension between the standard practical guidance critique and virtue 
ethics.  Like contextualists, particularists are often motivated by the notion that, because 
                                                                                                                                                 
from Lance, M.N. and M. Little “From particularism to defeasibility in ethics” in 
Challenging Moral Particularism. Edited by Lance, M.N., M. Potrc, and V. Strahovnik. 
Routledge:  New York.  pp 53-74. 2008 Both quotations from p. 57. 
 
28
 1141b4-16, 1142a 12-16, 23-b14. 
 
29
 Lance, M. and M. Little.  “Particularism and Antitheory” in Oxford Handbook of 
Ethical Theory.  Pp. 567-594. Pp. 580-581. 
 
30
 Lance and Little distinguish the sort of contextualism they endorse from Particularism 
by contextualism’s acceptance of some role of explanatory generalizations (v. 
Particularism’s rejection of generalizations as explanatory).  Lance and Little, “From 
Particularism to Defeasiblity in Ethics,” p. 53. 
31
 Little, M.O.  “Moral Generalities Revisited” in Moral Particularism, Little M.O. and 
B. Hooker, eds.  Oxford University Press, NY  (276-304) p. 288. 
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situations frequently present, “unique combinations of morally salient features; no 
principles, however subtle or complicated, provide an adequate guide or model of how 
we should navigate through them.”32  This claim is not incompatible with the possibility 
of true moral generalizations, but particularists reject the notion that these generalizations 
could be codified in a way such that a theory could be used to justify or guide actions. 
For particularists, the tension is rooted in the holism of reasons, which is 
incompatible both with the assumption that theory-building is adequate to the job of 
guiding action, and the view that the actual valence of a reason is fixed independently of 
the context. On a standard holist view, the valence of a moral consideration can switch 
because its role in justification of action is, “irreducibly dependent on the background 
context,” which, in combination with holism of reasons, implies that, 
[w]hile a given consideration may count as a moral reason on one 
occasion, say for doing such and such, the very same consideration is on 
another occasion is no reason for doing such and such, or even a reason 
precisely for not doing such and such.33 
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 Little, M.O.  “Moral Generalities Revisited” in Moral Particularism, Little, M.O. and 
B. Hooker, eds.  Pp. 276.  Little also points out that this complexity and rejection of 
principles suggests that even complex principles cannot adequately codify the “moral 
landscape”. P. 277. 
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 Millgram, Elijah. 2005. “Murdoch, Practical Reasoning, and Particularism” in Ethics 
Done Right: Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. Pp. 168-197.  p. 169.   
 
Jonathan Dancy gives a similar definition in Moral Reasons, claiming that the “leading 
thought behind particularism is the thought that behaviour of a reason (or a consideration 
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As a result, principled action guidance cannot be generalized in a meaningful way 
because, if the valence of a reason is irreducibly dependent on the situational context, the 
reliable connection on which the justificatory force of the statement depends, is disrupted.  
Without this connection, the system of generalizations lacks the “explanatory leverage” 
required to justify action in the situation. 34  
However, metaphysical holism is not the only adequate grounds on which one 
could reject the effectiveness of a code that develops rules for action guidance.  Based on 
the reasoning that general principles provide insufficient justification for particular 
actions, moral contextualists also argue that action guidance cannot be usefully 
codified.35   For example, the moral contextualism Mark Lance and Margaret Little 
endorse holds that theory-building is problematic not because the reasons themselves 
change value based on the whole, but because the moral landscape is too varied for 
generalizations to have their assumed explanatory leverage.36 Although the debate 
                                                                                                                                                 
that serves as a reason) in a new case cannot be predicted from its behaviour 
elsewhere…[s]o there is no ground for the hope that we can find out here how that 
consideration functions in general, somehow, nor for the hope that we can move in any 
smooth way to how it will function in a different case.” Dancy, Jonathan.  1993.  Moral 
Reasons.  Oxford, U.K.; Cambridge, U.S.A:  Blackwell Publishing.  Pp, 60. 
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 Little, M.O.  “Moral Generalities Revisited” Pp. 280. Millgram, Elijah. 2005. 
“Murdoch, Practical Reasoning, and Particularism” in Ethics Done Right: Practical 
Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pp. 168-197.  P. 169.  
 
35
 Lance and Little, “From Particularism to Defeasiblity in Ethics,” p. 55. 
 
36
 Lance and Little discuss this need for judgment, claiming that although it is accepted 
by generalists such as Ross and Kant, “much of particularism’s energy has been devoted 
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regarding codification focuses on holism as grounding claims of non-codifiability, 
atomistic versions of contextualism can challenge the extent to which guidance could be 
usefully codified as well.37  
Theoretically, there is nothing about endorsing moral contextualism, or even 
particularism, that precludes codification per se.38  In principle, one could develop an 
action-guiding rule for every situation, eliminating the problem that rules are not precise 
enough to guide action.  Yet, the nature of deliberation, especially with respect to the 
variability of relevant features among concrete situations, leads to virtue ethics’ rejection 
of codification as an inadequate form of applicable guidance based on a tension between 
developing precise guidance and producing guidance systematic enough to be useful to 
agents.39 Because codification of substantive action guidance would require systematicity 
to be applicable, endorsing deep and broad moral contextualist views is incompatible 
with developing complete and succinct sets of non-defeasible action-level rules.40  This 
                                                                                                                                                 
to [these claims’] fortification.” P. 574, 575 in “Particularism and Anti-Theory.” The 
term “explanatory leverage” is Lance and Little’s. 
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 Little, M.O.  “Moral Generalities Revisited”, Pp. 285. If the point is to identify factors 
and foundations, develop an interconnected set of explanation and justification, then the 
system is incompatible with the particularist view because if we cannot rely on reasons 
having the same valence, cannot develop a system that functions in this way. 
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 Watson, Gary. 1990. “On the Primacy of Character” in Identity, Character, and 
Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology. Edited by Flanagan, Owen J., and Amélie Rorty.  
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  P. 453, point 2, and the section conclusion. 
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 Nussbaum, Martha C. 1990. “The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian 
Conception of Private and Public Rationality” in Love's Knowledge: Essays on 
Philosophy and Literature. New York: Oxford University Press.  Pp. 54-105. p. 67. 
 
 17
resistance to codifiability that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics maintains because of its 
moral contextualism stands at the crux of the debate over whether the theory can provide 
agents substantive practical guidance, particularly codified and direct guidance.  
The Range of Practical Guidance Claims 
 Assuming expectations that virtue ethics provide agents with codified and direct 
guidance, virtue ethics fails to provide adequate practical guidance because the moral 
contextualism it entails is in tension with providing an extensively codified set of direct 
action-guidance prescriptions.  If effecting good action is a primary purpose for which we 
develop ethical theory and, by its nature, virtue ethics cannot provide guidance that does 
this, it seems we have reason to suspect virtue ethics is inadequate as an ethical theory.  
However, the specific expectations voiced among the various articulations of the practical 
guidance critique are vague and vary from suggesting that a theory provide a decision-
making procedure for action, to the general suggestion that ethical theory is aimed toward 
affecting action.41   
 This leaves an extensive range of possible claims that virtue ethics is expected to, 
but purportedly fails to meet.  The spectrum of possible claims that the practical guidance 
critique could be making against virtue ethics includes an extensive and wide-ranging set 
of expectations one have of an ethical theory.  I propose a list of claims along that 
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 Lance and Little, “From particularism to defeasibility in ethics.” 
 
41
 “When we inquire abut how to live, our aim is obviously to  live that way; and living, 
in this sense, is unavoidably something we do.  Moreover, although our lives are spread 
over many years, we live them one moment—and (roughly) one action—at a time.”  
Sher, George. 1998.  “Ethics, Character, and Action,” in Virtue and Vice, Frankel Paul, 
E., Miller, D.F., and J. Paul.  Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press p. 16. 
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spectrum that could plausibly underpin a practical guidance critique against virtue ethics.  
Among the more specific claims that the practical guidance critique could be making are:  
a.  Virtue ethics lacks a decision procedure for actions. 
b.  Virtue ethics lacks a system of explanatory or justificatory generalizations that can be 
used to translate situational features couched in non-moral terms into actions from 
moral reasons. 
c.  Virtue ethics lacks a hierarchical system of prima-facie rules of thumb 
d.  Virtue ethics lacks guidance for ordinary, novice, or otherwise uninitiated persons.   
e.  Virtue ethics lacks a rubric/field guide of morally relevant features so agents can 
identify them in situations.   
f.  Virtue ethics lacks theoretical guidance or standards to evaluate agents’ linguistic 
competence in moral terms. 42 
g.  Virtue ethics lacks suitable heuristics for action guidance.  
h.  Virtue ethics lacks an adequately accessible model for action or living a life well.  
i. Virtue ethics lacks empirically effective practical guidance.43 
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 Lance and Little, “Particularism and Antitheory”, pp. 576, 577.  The idea motivating 
this claim is that, linguistic competence depends heavily upon local usage, action under a 
description, etc., and because virtue ethics lacks simple, straightforward evaluative 
criteria for linguistic competence, it fails to meet a reasonable expectation of ethical 
theory.  Although this view does not posit the sorts of radical metaphysical claims that 
the holist particularists make, the claim is still at odds with the notion that one could 
develop a systematic decision-making procedure to guide agents’ actions in quandary 
situations.  
 
43
 This sort of expectation might be used to argue that right-making principles that can 
double as action guides are better on grounds of parsimony (simplicity to remember or 
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For example, concerns about codification of guidance range from the worry that virtue 
ethics lacks a decision procedure for actions,44 to a more general concern about theory-
building, that virtue ethics lacks a system of explanatory or justificatory generalizations 
that can be used to translate situational features couched in non-moral terms into actions 
from moral reasons.  However, at the much less stringent end of the spectrum, the worry 
may be no more than that virtue ethics lacks empirically effective practical guidance. 
 With respect to concerns about directness of guidance, considerations both 
regarding context of guidance and type of agent the theory can guide figure into the 
challenge to virtue ethics, but again the range of these claims is extensive.  For example, 
claims about directness of guidance such as, virtue ethics lacks guidance for ordinary, 
novice, or otherwise uninitiated persons, are far more stringent than challenges to virtue 
ethics such as, virtue ethics lacks an adequately accessible model for action or living a 
life well.  Because the breadth of the range of more specific claims that fit within the 
plausible range of concerns the practical guidance critique extents to include expectations 
virtue ethics can readily meet, claims against virtue ethics made by reference to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
learn), especially if one of the main aims of the view is to influence practice.  However, it 
is unclear the extent that considerations of parsimony are likely to be strong in cases 
where the evaluative and guidance terminology are functioning at different levels of 
generality and where the standards of justification vary based on the aim. 
 
44
 In each of the possible claims ‘lack’ is ambiguous between “cannot provide x” and 
“does not provide x”.  Although either could be a challenge to virtue ethics, for the 
remainder of the discussion, I focus on the “cannot provide x” version because, without 
adopting the additional assumption that a theory needs to do x to be adequate, the “does 
not provide x” version does not issue a strong challenge to virtue ethics if the view is 
compatible with providing x. 
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general practical guidance critique alone leave it unclear whether virtue ethics is truly 
threatened by the view. 
 The variety of guidance expectations that the practical guidance objection might 
support divides into three basic claims.  First, the first three claims (a-c above) make up a 
strong version of the practical guidance objection that all make the basic claim that virtue 
ethics cannot provide codified guidance that agents can apply.  The second main claim 
that we can glean from this spectrum of possible challenges to virtue ethics holds that 
virtue ethics cannot adequately guide because it fails to offer ordinary or untrained agents 
means by which to deploy whatever guidance the theory might offer, so the theory does 
not adequately influence action.  The third basic claim the practical guidance objection 
makes, is the much weaker claim that virtue ethics does not offer models or heuristics for 
guiding agents.  I aim to argue that the only version of the objection that gains purchase 
against virtue ethics is the second version, as the first is unduly stringent, and the third 
uninterestingly weak. 
Weak Guidance Expectations 
The last claim of the three main claims that the practical guidance objection 
makes against virtue ethics holds that virtue ethics cannot adequately guide because it 
fails to offer agents models of living well or heuristics for guidance.  I aim to argue that 
this version of the objection is easily met by any of the three main ethical theories.  
Because virtue ethics can readily meet this version of the objection, there is little reason 
to think that this version of the objection presents a substantive challenge to virtue ethics.  
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The expectation that virtue ethics provide agents some model of living well or 
heuristics to guide, or that it needs to offer some form of effective guidance, is a plausible 
expectation of an ethical theory.  However, this version of the claim does not pose a 
significant challenge to virtue ethics itself.  Virtue ethics can offer a variety of models of 
living well, heuristics to guide, and effective forms of guidance, such as the ideal of the 
virtuous person, which is often suggested as an effective way for agents to gain 
immediate guidance. 
Further, any ethical theory can offer these sorts of minimally guiding models of 
how to live well, models or heuristics that might offer suitably knowledgeable agents 
guidance.  If these are the claims that the practical guidance critique is expecting virtue 
ethics meet, it seems that the critique is much less interesting as a challenge to virtue 
ethics because the view has the resources to meet these (i.e. there is nothing in virtue 
ethics that precludes developing these means of guidance, even if no articulation of virtue 
ethics has yet attempted to develop these specific approaches.).  However, it is the 
stronger claims that tend to be the focus of charges that virtue ethics lacks appropriate 
means of providing adequate guidance.  I aim to argue in the next section that this version 
of the practical guidance objection assumes unduly stringent expectations not only of 
virtue ethics, but of ethical theory more broadly.  
Stringent Guidance Expectations 
 Among the three versions of the practical guidance objection, the one that seems 
to gain the most purchase against virtue ethics suggests that the non-codifiability virtue 
ethics endorses renders the theory incompatible with codification and direct guidance.  
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Because virtue ethics cannot offer agents codified guidance in such a way that it can be 
readily applied with little recourse to moral judgment, the theory fails to offer agents 
adequate practical guidance.  While it is true that virtue ethics cannot offer guidance 
codified in a way such that it can be applied with little recourse to moral judgment, I aim 
to argue that this expectation is unduly stringent, and thus virtue ethics need not make 
developing this sort of guidance its aim. 
Strictly speaking, both codification and direct guidance are compatible with virtue 
ethics, so for the practical guidance critique to challenge the theory, the expectation for 
guidance must be one that virtue ethics cannot meet.  Because virtue ethics is not 
inconsistent with codification, it is compatible with a variety of codified and direct means 
of guidance.45  For example, virtue ethics is compatible with action guidance codified 
through sets of rules of thumb that agents could use to evaluate act options.  Further, it 
could support probabilistic generalizations developed as summaries of past actions, 
which would meet an expectation of direct guidance at the action level.46   
In addition, virtue ethics is compatible with a more systematic set of defeasible 
generalizations structured as a theory that, given the privileged conditions, justifies action 
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 Watson, Gary. 1990. “On the Primacy of Character” in Identity, Character, and 
Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology. Edited by Flanagan, Owen J., and Amélie Rorty.  
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  See especially section 6.  Pp. 453. 
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 Like possible troubles with defeasible generalizations, the usefulness of rules of thumb 
on a virtue account is limited.  One concern with using generalizations for explanation is 
that even if they are defeasible or are used just for training agents to discern and 
deliberate well, adopting these rules carries a hazard of leading agents away from good 
judgment. 
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as suggested by deep moral contextualists like Lance and Little.47  For example, some 
contextualists endorse the usefulness of generalizations for developing applicable theory, 
arguing that moral contextualists need not reject codified guidance as ineffective.  Instead 
of rejecting the notion that theory-building is impossible because there is no set of 
exceptionless principles that can adequately justify action in a situation, we can endorse a 
theory comprised of defeasible moral generalizations, which are constrained by a set of 
privileging conditions that are “particularly ‘telling’ of something’s nature.”48 Defeasible 
generalizations serve as a codifiable alternative to exceptionless principles because they 
hold true only when privileged conditions obtain. Although proponents of virtue ethics 
need not reject all types of codification and direct guidance, due to the deep moral 
contextualism that stands between the axiological claims of the theory and practical 
application of the view, the notion that one could develop a theory of exceptionless 
principles that leads from the assumptions of the theory to a determinate act prescription 
in a particular situation are untenable. 
With respect to directness expectations, the common expectation of developing 
practical wisdom through experience suggests that virtue ethics has other, non-codified, 
means of direct guidance available to the agent as well, e.g. situational features that 
                                                 
 
47The Lance and Little view may offer a possible way that virtue ethics could embrace a 
codified set of action principles.  Yet, it seems that the substance of the debate about 
whether it could guide well relates to how useful these could be if the agent had to learn 
which conditions were privileged or deviation conditions, and whether these would be of 
any more use than rules of thumb, or just linguistic competence. 
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 Lance and Little, “From Particularism to Defeasibility in Ethics” p. 62. 
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constrain one’s decisions, and other, more virtuous agents to consult. It is at least prima 
facie plausible to think that we should provide a broad range of agents with all sorts of 
guidance, including direct, situationally-specific guidance.  Directness expectations can 
range widely on both the agent and context dimensions, seeking guidance for ordinary or 
novice agents, and with respect to agents in particular sorts of situations, ranging from 
everyday situations wherein an agent has a variety of morally-neutral or morally good 
choices to novel situations, morally ambiguous situations, or situations of moral dilemma 
wherein there is no choice available that does not somehow require the agent to do a 
“wrong” or “bad” action.  Although one might argue that virtue ethics’ focus on 
character-level qualities may be of little use in dilemma contexts, e.g., this focus neither 
precludes direct guidance, nor serves as an insurmountable obstacle to these stronger 
forms of direct guidance.  For example, there are a variety of ways agents can ascertain 
guidance by observing or asking other agents who have had success in similar situations, 
by studying the way actions in certain situations might serve as turning points in 
character development.  In this way, a directness expectation with respect to context or 
type of agent need not preclude an agent from ascertaining good action guidance   
Yet, the claim that virtue ethics cannot provide the appropriate type of guidance 
seems to overlook the sorts of codified and direct guidance virtue ethics can provide, 
even if the role of this sort of guidance is limited by the contextualism it endorses.  That 
the practical guidance critique does not focus on developing the sorts of codified 
guidance virtue ethics has available suggests that the practical guidance critique is 
assuming a more stringent form of codified guidance from virtue ethics. 
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The most stringent expectations for codification involve not only principled 
guidance that can be used to justify particular actions, but also direct guidance at the 
action-level that agents can use to apply the theory.  For example, Rosalind Hursthouse 
characterizes a strong codification expectation as expecting a set of,  
universal rules or principles which would…amount to a decision 
procedure for determining what the right action was in any particular case, 
[and]…would be stated in such terms that any non-virtuous person could 
understand and apply them correctly.49 
A theory composed of these universal, yet detailed principles is mentioned at least as a 
possible method for agents to use in solving novel situations, or for ordinary reasoners to 
use.50 
Although these expectations seem plausible as means of providing agents with 
substantive practical guidance, endorsing these as an expectation for virtue ethics invokes 
the entrenched tension between precision and systematicity.  On one hand, the nature of 
navigating within particular situations requires the broad generality for codifying 
universal principles for the purposes of action guidance.  On the other, the precision 
required to offer detailed guidance to agents in particular situations precludes a system of 
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 Hursthouse, R.  On Virtue Ethics.  Oxford University Press, 1999.  Pp. 39, 40.  
Hursthouse refers to this as the “strong codifiability thesis” (p. 40), and credits E. 
Pincoffs with presenting the view that this is a standard expectation of normative ethical 
accounts. 
 
50
 Lance and Little articulate a very similar expectation of ethical theory in “Particularism 
and Antitheory, p. 573, calling it “the Enlightenment model of morality.” 
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principles that fits within the limits of human psychology to navigate effectively.  
Without a way to systematically identify the relations between situational features and 
good actions (and on virtue accounts, actions and good character), virtue ethics is 
unlikely to develop a readily-applicable decision-making procedure for ethics. The 
tension between true generalizations and applying them to concrete circumstances forms 
a dilemma between developing accurate general principles that are too imprecise to apply 
when the particulars are difficult to discern, and an indefinitely large series of universal 
action guidance principles that, as a group, are too unwieldy to apply in practice.51  As 
action guidance on a virtue ethics account, it is not useful because it is unlikely that a 
theory develop this sort of strong codification that involves both principled and direct 
guidance because of its psychological implausibility.   
The failure to offer this sort of guidance is not unique to virtue ethics, however.  
The tension between systematicity and precision is a more general phenomenon of any 
theory that needs to account for facts of indefinite number and diverse variety, and, in 
ethics, is a problem faced also by Kantian and Utilitarian moral theories in providing 
applicable guidance.  At least, this suggests that virtue ethics cannot be singled out as 
inadequate, because this failure comparably affects the two other main competing 
theories in the contemporary context.  At most, if the practical guidance critique is 
endorsing these strong codification expectations as conditions of adequacy of a theory, it 
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implies a sweeping skeptical claim about the very endeavor of ethical theorizing because 
no moral theory could systematically provide this sort of detailed guidance.   
A More Reasonable Practical Guidance Objection 
Because the practical guidance critique does not target ethical theory more 
broadly, it seems that the expectation for guidance is likely weaker than the strong forms 
of codification that imply skepticism.  Yet, the commonly voiced concern with virtue 
ethics’ lack of guidance for use in novel situations or by novice moral reasoners, suggests 
that the expectation for codification requires more direct and less plastic forms of 
guidance than what virtue ethics would endorse as conducive to good deliberation.  The 
claim that virtue ethics cannot provide guidance in a way comparable to the way 
Utilitarian and Kantian views guide serves as a less stringent form of an expectation that 
combines codified and direct guidance, yet singles out virtue ethics as uniquely 
inadequate with respect to practical guidance among the three theories.    
 This comparability version of the critique suggests that even if strong codification 
is not possible, virtue ethics at least should provide a right-making account of action that 
agents can use to guide their deliberations.  Kantian and Utilitarian theories provide a 
small set of foundational principles that function not only as a right-making account of 
action, but also serve as a ready act-based evaluative structure from which a decision-
making procedure can be derived.  Because virtue ethics develops a character-level 
evaluative structure and replaces principled action guidance with practical wisdom, the 
role it assigns moral judgment appears unmanageably extensive from a guidance 
standpoint.  For example, virtue ethics leaves novice moral reasoners, or other agents 
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who find themselves in novel situations without guidance in ways that Utilitarian and 
Kantian views do not. 
 However, the role moral judgment plays in applying Utilitarian and Kantian 
precepts is not obviously so much less extensive that it makes the view manageable by a 
novice or provides adequate action guidance to an agent in a novel situation.52  Both Mill 
and Kant acknowledged an important role for moral judgment on their accounts.53  
Further, Rosalind Hursthouse has argued that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics can provide 
comparably codified action guidance via a virtue-based right-making account of action, 
developing an action-guiding principle in parallel form and, she claims, comparably 
guiding.54 
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 For example, there has been a significant amount of discussion of intermediaries agents 
can use to apply Utilitarian and Kantian principles accurately and precisely in concrete 
circumstances, suggesting that the need for an intermediary method to guide deliberation 
and discernment is not unique to virtue ethics. 
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 For example, Mill addresses the issue of exceptions to the secondary rules of action he 
advocates as guidance, with reference to the first principle only to adjudicate among the 
“intermediate generalizations,” or rules of thumb that we should use to guide action.  He 
argues that not only Utilitarianism, but all moral theories require latitude in judgment “for 
accommodation to peculiarities of circumstances,” noting that, 
 “[i]t is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of human affairs, 
that rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions, and that hardly any 
kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always 
condemnable.”  Mill, J.S.  Utilitarianism, in On Liberty and Other Essays,  Oxford 
University Press, 1991.  pp. 157. 
 On a Kantian account, significant amounts of moral judgment are required to 
formulate the maxim on which an agent intends to act, and which the agent can test using 
the Categorical Imperative.  In addition, the entire class of imperfect duties leaves agents 
with extensive latitude in how these duties are fulfilled, requiring significant moral 
judgment as well. 
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Yet, because Utilitarian and Kantian theories offer action level guidance that can 
be assessed in action level terms, the views may nonetheless remain more conducive to 
providing practical guidance.  Where action-level guidance on virtue accounts still 
requires an agent to assess his or her action in character-level terms, Utilitarian and 
Kantian accounts more directly answer the question “what ought I do?”  While Utilitarian 
and Kantian views may provide more direct action-level guidance, given the significant 
role of moral judgment required to apply these accounts, it is not clear that act-level 
principles guide sufficiently well to leave Utilitarianism and Kantianism invulnerable to a 
practical guidance expectation that ethical theory guide novice, ordinary, or otherwise 
untrained agents. 
It is this gap between the general principles that ground a theory and the activity 
that the axiology of the theory identifies as valuable to realize, that the third version of 
the practical guidance objection challenges virtue ethics to bridge.  In part, this gap 
remains because one assumption of ethical theory is that it is aimed toward influencing 
action.  Add to this the common contemporary assumption that the set of agents toward 
which this applies is broad, including agents without special knowledge of ethical 
theories, and it seems that there is a practical guidance issue that virtue ethics should 
work to meet, namely the version of the practical guidance objection that falls between 
the unduly stringent and uninterestingly weak extremes commonly assumed as part of the 
practical guidance objection. 
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 Hursthouse argues that virtue ethics can provide comparably guiding codification in 
Part I of On Virtue Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. 1999. 
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Although well-motivated by the aim to affect action for a wide-ranging group of 
moral agents, the most stringent codification and directness expectations are too broad to 
challenge virtue ethics alone.  Weaker expectations, suggesting that virtue ethics cannot 
provide comparably substantive practical guidance to agents, are too narrow to rule out 
the codified guidance measures virtue ethics has at hand.  Because the stringent 
codification standards snare the purportedly more guiding theories [Utilitarianism and 
Kantianism] and fail to acknowledge the various resources virtue ethics has for providing 
guidance, these expectations are implausibly stringent and neither practical guidance 
critics nor virtue theorists should expect these of an ethical theory.  While act-level 
guidance principles may offer agents a prima facie simple and immediate means of action 
guidance, their form as act-based principles does not distinguish them as offering 
substantially more practical guidance to ordinary agents than comparably framed precepts 
of virtue ethics. 
Conclusion: 
 The practical guidance critique presents a potentially strong challenge to virtue 
ethics, claiming it lacks the resources to meet a primary purpose for which we develop 
ethical theories: guiding action.  Yet, because the specific claims the critique makes 
against virtue ethics are vague, the extent to which the practical guidance critique gains 
purchase against virtue ethics is unclear.  Further, the range of possible claims the 
practical guidance critique may be advancing against virtue ethics is extensive, including 
not only implausibly stringent expectations for guidance from a theory, but also 
uninterestingly weak claims that fail to ensure any sort of useful guidance from a theory.   
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In an attempt to discern which practical guidance expectations virtue ethics might 
plausibly be expected to meet, I suggest that we consider the list of more specific claims 
the general practical guidance objection supports.  Once we do this, we can see that the 
practical guidance objection divides into three main sorts of claims.   One claim, that 
ethical theory offer agents models or heuristics to guide, fails as a challenge to virtue 
ethics because it is easily met, and thus uninterestingly weak as a challenge.  A second, 
that suggests virtue ethics needs to provide codified guidance to adequately guide, proves 
unduly stringent.  A third claim that the practical guidance objection supports, however, 
poses a more compelling challenge to virtue ethics, claiming that virtue ethics fails to 
solve the problem of ensuring effective practical guidance, a plausible corollary of the 
claim that ethical theory is ultimately aimed at affecting action. 
This third claim challenges virtue ethics because, unlike the other two main 
claims of the practical guidance objection, it cannot be dismissed as either implausibly 
stringent or uninterestingly weak.  Because this third option hinges on an assumption that 
both the practical guidance objection and ethical theories share, that ethical theory should 
aim, at some level, to guide agents, virtue ethics at least needs to account for the ways in 
which it does this.  Further, if the common contemporary assumption that the relevant 
group of agents who need guidance is quite broad, i.e. that an ethical theory should 
appeal to and guide even ordinary agents, then this strengthens the challenge this third 
version of the practical guidance claim poses to virtue ethics.  In the next chapter, I 
consider three ways that virtue ethics attempts to address this most reasonable version of 
the objection, arguing that the objection ultimately has gains purchase against 
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contemporary accounts of virtue ethics because a problematic gap remains between these 
proposed guidance schemata and virtue.
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Chapter 2   
Ideal Agency and Action Guidance 
If we develop ethical theories primarily to influence action, a comprehensive 
ethical account requires some sort of guidance method or intermediary between theory 
and practice.  In this chapter, I aim to argue that the third version of the practical 
guidance objection gains purchase against virtue ethics.  I consider common ways neo-
Aristotelian virtue ethics proposes to provide practical guidance and argue that each fails 
to provide adequate guidance to ordinary, novice, or untrained agents.   
 Of the three practical guidance proposals, Rosalind Hursthouse’s shows the most 
promise as it delineates an action guidance principle for virtue ethics and corresponding 
practical precepts that can offer agents specific and numerous proscriptions and 
prescriptions for action.  However, even this account falls short of implementing these 
precepts for ordinary agents.  Without a method of deploying this account of action 
guidance, the practical guidance objection retains its force as the gap between the 
practical precepts Hursthouse introduces and virtue remains too great to effectively guide 
ordinary agents.  Although an implementation method would not replace the guidance 
schema Hursthouse proposes, it requires an intermediary to supplement her account and 
offer a means by which ordinary non-virtuous agents can implement the practical 
precepts she proposes and become more virtuous. 
Common Neo-Aristotelian Guidance Methods 
 A common response to the concern that virtue ethics cannot offer agents practical 
guidance is that it does, but not by a code of act-level principles or set of non-defeasible 
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rules.  Instead, agents can gain guidance from the basic precept: “do what the virtuous 
do.”55  This sort of response fits the standard expectations of virtue ethics, that it is 
resistant to principled action guidance, and so cannot set forth a set of act-level principles 
for agents to follow.   
John McDowell articulates a paradigm account of action guidance from a neo-
Aristotelian virtue view, one that preserves its corollary resistance to codification.  Based 
on the view that an agent’s worldview is complex and varied in its valuations, it is all but 
impossible to encapsulate in act-level principles which particular features the agent will 
find salient because any of a variety of factors might strike the perceiver as morally 
relevant, factor into one’s deliberations about action, and serve as a reason to act.56  Even 
in seemingly similar situations, ostensibly negligible features of a situation can factor into 
one’s deliberative processes differently.57  The salient features of a situation and the way 
they figure into an agent’s deliberations and justifications for actions do not fit neatly into 
a concise rubric, and cannot be predicted with enough accuracy to reproduce the results 
of the process. 
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 See, e.g., Hursthouse, 1999. On Virtue Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 
McDowell, John.  1997.  “Virtue and Reason” in Virtue ethics. Edited by Crisp, Roger 
and Michael A. Slote. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press.  Pp 141-162; and Johnson, Robert N. 2003. “Virtue and Right.” Ethics: 
An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy 113 (4) (07/01): 810-
34.  
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 This empirical point has been supported by a variety of studies in social psychology, 
beginning with Nisbett, R., and T.Wilson. “Telling more than we can know: Verbal 
reports on mental processes.” Psychological Review, 84, 231-259. 1977. 
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Action guidance via a set of act-level principles is not feasible on a virtue ethics 
account because,  
If one attempted to reduce one’s conception of what virtue requires to a set 
of rules, then, however subtle and thoughtful one was in drawing up the 
code, cases would inevitably turn up in which a mechanical application of 
the rules would strike one as wrong.58   
Without a principled code to guide action on a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, a person 
acts well instead because he, “has a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement 
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 McDowell, John.  1997.  “Virtue and Reason” in Virtue ethics. Edited by Crisp, Roger 
and Michael A. Slote. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press.  Pp 141-162.  p. 148.  
 
Nussbaum argues that on Aristotle’s account, “it is in the very nature of truly rational 
practical choice that it cannot be made more ‘scientific’ without becoming worse.” 
Nussbaum, Martha C. 1990. “The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian 
Conception of Private and Public Rationality” in Love's Knowledge: Essays on 
Philosophy and Literature. New York: Oxford University Press.  Pp. 54-105.  p. 55. See 
also Broadie, p. 352.  She notes that Aristotle gives no answer to “what to do” and cannot 
provide a decision-making theory for this purpose. 
 
Louden, Robert B. 1997 “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics” in Virtue Ethics. Edited by 
Crisp, Roger and Michael A. Slote. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press.  Pp. 201-216. p. 206. Citing the variability of practical wisdom 
as particularly problematic feature with respect to offering practical guidance to agents 
who are not already virtuous, Louden acknowledges that,  
“As virtue theorists from Aristotle onward have rightly emphasized, virtues are not 
simply dispositions to behave in specified ways, for which rules and principles can 
always be cited.  In addition, they involve skills of perception and articulation, situation-
specific ‘know-how’, all of which are developed only through recognizing and acting on 
what is relevant in concrete moral contexts as they arise.  These skills of moral perception 
and practical reasoning are not completely routinizeable, and so cannot be transferred 
from agent to agent as any sort of decision procedure ‘package deal.’” 
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that situations impose on behavior.”59  Good judgments are a matter of correctly 
perceiving moral facts that exist in the world, and virtue is a type of knowledge in which 
one, “gets things right.”60 
Further, if an agent relies on a rule in some case or other, it is because of one’s 
character that the person has selected this rule, not that one, to apply in this case.61  Yet, 
the primary source of action guidance on a virtue ethics view is not produced by seeking 
out guiding universal principles.  Although rules are not excluded as acceptable means of 
action guidance and are likely necessary for offering agents effective action guidance, 
their justificatory authority is limited.  Instead of seeking guidance by following 
Utiliatarian or Kantian-style rules, “[o]ccasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if one 
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 McDowell, John.  1997.  “Virtue and Reason” in Virtue ethics. Edited by Crisp, Roger 
and Michael A. Slote. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press.  Pp 141-162.  p.142.  
 
Also, Wiggins claims, “[i]n no case will there be a rule to which a man can simply appeal 
to tell him what to do (except in the special case where an absolute prohibition 
operates).” Wiggins, David. 1998. “Deliberation and Practical Reason,” in Needs, Values, 
Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  Pp. 215-239.  
P. 236. Also note that acting well itself is not inimical to comporting with a code, but is 
unlikely that individuals can gain good action guidance using only a code. 
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 McDowell, John.  1997.  “Virtue and Reason” in Virtue ethics. Edited by Crisp, Roger 
and Michael A. Slote. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press.  Pp 141-162.  p.142. 
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 Watson, Gary. 1990. “On the Primacy of Character” in Identity, Character, and 
Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology. Edited by Flanagan, Owen J., and Amélie Rorty.  
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  pp. 453, 454.  
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does, not by applying universal principles but by being a certain kind of person:  one who 
sees situations in a certain distinctive way.”62   
According to McDowell’s account, what counts as an adequate reason need not 
make direct reference to a general ethical principle.  On the contrary, an adequate reason 
in some cases may require no more than the recognition that this action is, “the thing to 
do.”63 Although he acknowledges that rules might have a role in training one’s perceptual 
capacity, the role rules can play contrasts with the sort of strong codification on which 
direct and situation-specific action guidance is purportedly derived from justificatory 
generalizations.  On a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics view, “generalizations will be 
approximate at best, and examples will need to be taken with the sort of ‘and so on’ 
which appeals to the cooperation of a hearer.”64  Good discernment, deliberation, and 
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 McDowell notes that, “[i]t is by virtue of his seeing a particular fact rather than that 
one as the salient fact about the situation that he is moved to act by this concern rather 
than that one.”  According to McDowell, “this reason is apprehended, not as outweighing 
or overriding any reasons for acting in other ways which would otherwise be constituted 
by other aspects of the situation…but as silencing them.”  Quotation from McDowell, 
John.  1997.  “Virtue and Reason” in Virtue ethics. Edited by Crisp, Roger and Michael 
A. Slote. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.  
Pp 141-162,   p. 146.  See also, Ibid. Pp. 142, 157, 162. 
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 According to McDowell, agents need not even recognize the virtuousness in their own 
actions, the virtuousness of an action can be judged instead by an external observer.  This 
is one of the points that gives rise to the concerns of the practical guidance critique, 
namely the worries that the agent might not be able to explain her reasoning, might not 
offer an obviously repeatable pattern of actions, and the reasoning process may reject 
rules.  Plus, agent my use internalized principles, but, like grammar, need not be able to 
articulate them explicitly. 
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 McDowell, John.  1997.  “Virtue and Reason” in Virtue ethics. Edited by Crisp, Roger 
and Michael A. Slote. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
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action depend largely on the agent, the particular contexts in which she learns, and the 
variety, number and sort of experiences to which she is exposed, which precludes 
developing a guidance method by which an agent learns how to act well solely by 
adhering to a single or small set of act-based principles. 
McDowell’s view echoes Aristotle’s that agents learn to live well by good 
upbringing, and justification for individual actions rests irreducibly on particulars. 
However, this approach does not isolate a single sort of universally applicable method by 
which agents develop good judgment.  Instead, the specific means by which agents 
develop practical wisdom and good habits of character may vary widely. Although there 
is nothing especially implausible about this sort of expectation itself, if the aim of a 
theory is practical guidance, the theory itself neither generates guidance rules, nor 
requires a particular method of guidance.  Although different variations of guidance 
methods develop different ways to discern what the virtuous would do in the 
circumstance, agency models are a commonly suggested as a means by which agents can 
obtain guidance, yet which also preserve the commitment to uncodifiability. 
Agency Models of Guidance 
A second common approach to offering agents concrete guidance within standard 
virtue ethics conceptual constraints posits a more systematic version of the view 
McDowell delineates.  The method of guidance suggests that individuals emulate 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press.  Pp 141-162.  P. 156. On McDowell’s view, instead of knowing how to 
act being a matter of following a rule, persons need to be trained on a case by case basis, 
learning, by proper upbringing, what the appropriate response to each situation is as it 
arises. For McDowell, rules cannot accommodate the project of either being or becoming 
a virtuous person. 
 39
virtuous agents as a way of obtaining practical action guidance that meets the evaluative 
criteria of a virtue account.65  On this model, agents know what action is good to do in a 
particular situation because it is what the virtuous person would do.  This sort of agency 
model takes one of two main forms, ascertaining right action from an exemplary agent or 
from an ideal agent, and provides two means of guidance: emulation and advice.   
The exemplary agent account recommends that agents seeking guidance do what 
a virtuous agent (or an agent more virtuous than herself) does.  This form of guidance 
comports with common non-codificationist commitments of virtue ethics, e.g. its agent-
level evaluative focus.  It also fits within the constraints of a moderate practical guidance 
critique by providing practical precepts that fit plausibly within the constraints human 
psychology imposes on their effective use.   
However, one might object that the view provides agents insufficient guidance 
because the agent may (and perhaps frequently does) find herself in situations, e.g. moral 
dilemmas, that the virtuous agent would avoid in the first place and thus a standpoint 
from which the virtuous would never have had to deliberate and act.66  If this is the case, 
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 See Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. On Virtue Ethics. New York: Oxford University 
Press. P. 35.  The distinction between virtuous and more virtuous is relevant to the issue 
of plausibility.  If a neo-Aristotelian virtue view adheres to Aristotle’s 6 character 
categories (brutish-superhumanly virtuous), the likelihood of individuals having access to 
virtuous individuals to emulate is so small, it would make the view implausible as a 
response to the practical guidance problem. 
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 Harman and Hursthouse both point this out.  Harman voices this concern in “Human 
Flourishing, Ethics, and Liberty”, p. 315.  Hursthouse brings up this point in her “Virtue 
Theory and Abortion.” Hursthouse also suggests that the agent ask an actual virtuous 
agent, or an agent more virtuous than oneself for guidance, in On Virtue Ethics, p. 35. 
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the view may be silent in a wide range of circumstances where it is important for an agent 
to discern well how to act.  Further, if the virtuous agent need not articulate his reasoning 
with respect to a general principle, and need know only that this is “the thing to do” in the 
circumstances, the virtuous’ reasoning have may not be adequately informative to serve 
as guiding for another agent.67 
In response to this sort of worry, some argue that instead of modeling behavior 
directly, an agent could gain advice from someone more virtuous, leading to a “virtuous 
advisor” model.  One concern with the advisor model is that even if a virtuous agent were 
available to query, the virtuous agent would not have any way to guide the less virtuous 
based on his or her experience.68  For example, it is unclear that to be virtuous, a person 
                                                                                                                                                 
Millgram makes a point similar to Hursthouse and Harman’s, in Ethics Done Right:  
Practical Reasoning as A Foundation for Moral Theory.  Cambridge University Press, 
NY, 1005.  P. 173. 
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 E.g. consider this concern regarding McDowell’s view based on his views about 
reasons being silenced and the perceptual model on which an agent knows what the right 
thing to do is because they intuit or perceive the salient features of the circumstances and 
how they relate to the broader ethical questions involved.  However, this concern could 
apply even to views that do not endorse a perceptual model of deliberation.  It is unclear 
that good actions require discussion of the final ends, so the answer to “why did you do 
that?” might have the response from the virtuous, “because he needed my help,” which, 
without already understanding the weight of this sort of response in a broader discussion 
is not guiding at all. The reasons a virtuous person might give would likely have little 
purchase with others without an extensive set of shared assumptions or experiences of the 
world. 
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 Consider the extensive Aristotelian criteria for virtue (especially if the view endorses a 
strong version of the unity thesis—v. a sort of “limited unity”), as well as the evidence 
from social psychology regarding the fragmentation of character in contrast with the 
robustness required for virtue.  
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must be able to offer good advice to those in very different circumstances than those with 
which the virtuous is familiar or to one who is not already responsive to a similar set of 
reasons or situational features. 
Another problem that plagues both views is the rarity of virtuous in the 
population.  Virtue is difficult to achieve and thus rare, so even if the virtuous were able 
to advise others in different sorts of circumstances, it would be unlikely to find a virtuous 
person to act as an advisor.  Due to the lack of virtuous agents to query and the 
psychological implausibility that their answer will be informative in a way such that it is 
substantively action guiding for the non-virtuous, the exemplary virtue guidance account 
can be quickly traded for accounts involving idealized agency.   
The ideal agency model parallels the exemplary virtuous view of guidance, but 
does not require an actual agent to query.  Instead, the agent gains insight into what 
action to perform by imagining and emulating the reasoning and actions or advice of the 
virtuous agent in circumstances like those in which the agent now finds herself.  Once the 
agent simulates the various perceptual, deliberative, affective, and behavioral 
considerations that the virtuous would, she acts in accordance with the virtuous’ behavior 
or advice as envisioned by the agent in the quandary.69   
                                                                                                                                                 
See Louden’s objection regarding the perceptual model of practical reasoning forwarded 
by John McDowell in, Louden, Robert B. 1997 “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics” in 
Virtue Ethics. Edited by Crisp, Roger and Michael A. Slote. Oxford Readings in 
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 See Kawall, Jason. 2006. “On the Moral Epistemology of Ideal Observer Theories.” 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: An International Forum 9 (3) (06/01): 359-74.; 
Kawall, Jason.  2004. “Moral Response-Dependence, Ideal Observers, and the Motive of 
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With respect to action guidance, both the exemplary agency and ideal agency 
models provide agents some guidance because, even if the agent lacks the motivational 
and dispositional state required to actually perform the action she believes the virtuous 
would perform in those circumstances, the method at least provides the agent an answer 
to the “what ought I do?” by directing the inquiring agent to consider the characteristic 
features of virtue ethics.  Further, if an agent has a sense of the range of activities the 
virtuous might engage in, by having a sense of the nature of virtue, she would also have 
some understanding of what the relevant affective and perceptual features should be as 
well.  Over time, it is possible the agent can develop the deliberative and affective 
responses and habits that move her from being akratic or enkratic to virtuous.  However, 
the vagueness with respect to which action to do on each view leaves open a question of 
whether the view provides the sort of guidance sought on the practical guidance critique.   
Codified Virtue Guidance 
A third means of guidance, is proposed by Rosalind Hursthouse in On Virtue 
Ethics.  Here, Hursthouse extends this sort of view to meet the practical guidance critics’ 
claim that virtue accounts cannot guide because they resist codification. Speaking more 
directly to critics, Hursthouse claims that action guidance from virtue ethics can be 
codified in a way that parallels the main competing views:  Utilitarianism and 
Kantianism.  She claims that an agent can look to the principle of right action for virtue 
                                                                                                                                                 
Duty: Responding to Zangwill.” Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic 
Philosophy 60 (3) (05/01): 357-69; and Doris, John M. 2002, Lack of Character: 
Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University 
Press.  pp. 148-152. 
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ethics and the subsidiary v-rules to guide her deliberation about what to do.  The 
paradigm formulation of such a universal ethical principle Hursthouse claims is, “An 
action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances.”70  Not only 
does it parallel principles like formulations of the Categorical Imperative and the Utility 
Principle, but it demonstrates that, even if it is not common within the standards 
characterizations of virtue ethics, the theory can support a principle of right action. 
This guidance method is important because not only does it fit within the 
contextualist constraints of virtue ethics, but it also offers a principle-based action 
through a guidance structure parallel to Utilitarian and Kantian forms.  One might argue 
that it does not offer an adequate way to guide action in the situation because it still 
requires one derive from the agent level the right action.71  However, in addition to the 
general action guidance principle, Hursthouse introduces the notion of “V-Rules” a set of 
rules that derive from the guidance claim and which, she claims, offers more specific act 
prescriptions than Utilitarian and Kantian accounts, so offer at least as much guidance, 
comparatively.  Hursthouse argues that the view provides not only codified action-
guiding precepts, but that these provide at least comparable, if not better, concrete action 
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 Hursthouse contends that this basic principle yields a variety of more specific rules that 
are at least as guiding as those produced from the basic principles of either Utilitarian or 
Kantian views.  This is present in various articles of Hursthouse, notably in “Virtue 
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 Louden’s view also is concerned with the issue of the possible circularity of the 
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[especially in the globalized context]—the individual seeking guidance will not know 
whom to choose to emulate. 
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guidance because this principle gives rise to a series of  “V-Rules,” such as “do what is 
just” which serve as more specific guides for agents in particular situations. 
Hursthouse defines V-Rules as, “rules or principles which have pretty general 
application and the best blend of specificity and flexibility, but which nevertheless do not 
hold in every conceivable case,”72 and she notes that V-Rules are particularly useful 
means of guidance as V-rules each serve to highlight both act prescriptions and 
proscriptions.73  She argues that even though they require use of “thick” terms that 
require extensive experience and to understand and use properly, this does not put her 
view at a disadvantage compared to the competing ethical theories.74  Because each of the 
views require some sort of thick term discernment, and Kantian views in particular use 
evaluative terms in an importantly similar way, the account cannot be rejected solely on 
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 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics p. 36  Also, on p. 51 she claims that they are not only 
action guiding, but also act-assessing.  If we distinguish among the various purposes for 
which we might develop an ethical account, this point is of use if there is reason to think 
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theory section that it her v-rules account can accommodate even those who are not 
virtuous and find themselves in situations that the virtuous wouldn’t. 
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 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics pp. 59-61.  On page 58, she claims that many of the 
virtues are well-enough defined to get act-prescriptions, but that justice is a notable 
exception.  Given the range of terms she sees as virtue-terms, e.g. honesty, compassion, 
etc., it is likely that most of the five classical virtues would be “exceptional” in the same 
was justice is on her view, bringing back the spectre of the V-rules being of little use to 
all except moral experts. 
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the grounds that it requires thick terms.75  For example, she notes further that, as with 
many terms, the “v-terms” featured in the v-rules, e.g. ‘courage’, ‘compassion’, etc., can 
be defined for children or others unfamiliar with the use of a moral term by reference to 
other, simpler, more familiar terms.76  In this way, even the need to understand thick 
terms are not an insurmountable obstacle to application. 
This practical guidance schema, rendered both in the form of an action guidance 
principle, and as more specific rules for agents to use as practical precepts, meets not 
only the basic aims outlined by a moderate practical guidance critique, but also more 
stringent codificationist expectations for practical guidance that derive from expectations 
that virtue ethics offer guidance accessible to a wide range of agents.  However, it 
remains vulnerable to the concerns that challenge the agency models.  Because it requires 
a similar process of deliberation by the agent in the sense that in order to assess whether 
or not the action the agent is considering is right, the worries regarding the derivativeness 
of the guidance resurface.  Like the agency models, in a concrete situation, the agent must 
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 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p.80.  The comment regarding the need for an account of 
moral education seems likely to be an inescapable feature of a comprehensive ethical 
account more generally.  As I aim to argue later in the chapter, a feature of action 
guidance that the practical guidance critics overlook/should but do not focus on in their 
critique of virtue ethics as not action-guiding.  Because virtue ethics, as a theory, is only 
indirectly action guiding, I argue that articulating an account of moral development is 
particularly important for virtue ethics.  
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be able to imagine what the virtuous agent would do in those particular circumstances in 
order to know what to do.77 
Virtue Ethics’ Guidance and Practical Guidance Expectations  
Each of the three main approaches accomplishes the task of accommodating the 
distinctive features of Aristotelian practical reasoning endorsed on many contemporary 
virtue accounts.  For example, all three models preserve the complexity of moral 
decision-making and focus on the agent as the evaluative entity.  The V-rules and Ideal 
Agency Models respect a limited role of codification in providing agents action guidance, 
and do so in at least a minimally psychologically plausible way.  However, even though 
each fits into both a standard Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics conceptual schema and 
within the practical guidance constraints as well, this does not provide the sort of 
guidance the practical guidance critique tacitly assumes an ethical theory should include. 
As models for action guidance, each of these proposed methods meet the 
theoretical demands of an Aristotelian account of practical wisdom, which precludes the 
priority of principles and fosters a codification-resistant decision-making process.  In 
addition, they meet minimal psychological realism constraints as we commonly think 
back to particular things others have done or told us and use them to guide our actions. 
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Further, the general precepts to do as the virtuous would do or advise, and their 
elaboration in V-Rules are at least prima facie guiding because the agent knows at least 
that virtuous agent is one who does the right actions in the right circumstances, in the 
right way with the right affect with a unity of certain moral character traits such as 
justice, temperance, wisdom, courage.78  Even if the agent knows only this much, this 
information offers at least a rough guide to the sorts of considerations that she should 
draw into her deliberation and act upon in the circumstance.79  Yet, it is not clear that the 
constraints imposed by the theoretical commitments of virtue ethics combined with the 
moderate expectations of the practical guidance critique are sufficient to reliably produce 
action that comports with standards of good character.  
If these standards are correct, a virtue ethics that meets these can at best offer 
derivative guidance, or, much worse, the guidance it can offer is all but vacuous. Because 
the agent’s ability to discern action guidance by reflecting on the virtues depends 
substantially not only upon the features of the situation that the agent finds salient, but 
also the way the agents sees them relating to the relevant reasons, these ideal agency and 
V-rule guidance models offer little substantive action guidance.80  Although 
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psychologically plausible and compatible with the practical reasoning account of virtue 
ethics, applying these practical precepts in a way such that the theory influences action 
requires an agent’s decision-making abilities to be conditioned through experience so the 
agent can discern which of the situational features are relevant to her deliberations and 
integrate them into her reasoning accordingly.81   
Further, virtue ethics reserves a significant place for practical wisdom.  Emulating 
the practically wise requires more than doing the action the practically wise would, but 
requires an agent have developed the appropriate sensitivities and responses that can 
discern salient features across a broad range of situations and distill the relevant features 
from situations of significant variety, complexity, and novelty, something that cannot be 
achieved by theoretical reflection alone. On these models, without the requisite 
experience the deliberative process collapses into the agent’s own judgment, limited by 
his or her present understanding of the terms, assessment of the features of the 
circumstances, and ability to imagine the viewpoint of a virtuous agent or advisor.  
Without either a more guiding model or access to the situation-specific advice the 
virtuous agent might give, the exemplary and idealized agency models lack the ability to 
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 Despite advocating a type of ideal agency model, Hursthouse also acknowledges the 
need for moral education, e.g. see Hursthouse, R.  On Virtue Ethics, p. 38.  She 
articulates this view further in “Practical Wisdom, A Mundane Account” as well. 
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provide agents with guidance that meets the expectations of the standard practical 
guidance critique.82   
In addition, even if an agent does not know exactly what the virtuous would do, 
the action guidance models virtue ethics offers, although perhaps indirect, are not entirely 
uninformative.  Even if a gap remains between the specification of the ideal and the 
application in any particular situation, one might argue that this gap is no more 
problematic than that which the consequentialist or deontologist faces in applying their 
theories.83  Although action guidance from a virtue account is by its nature indirect (i.e., 
it derives from a conception of good character or what is involved in realizing a good 
character trait), Hursthouse argues that the V-rules, for example, are adequately guiding 
because a trait offers a proliferation of guidance rules for each situation. 
The V-Rule view Hursthouse advances can be distinguished from these 
approaches by the specificity of the rules it develops, and, because of the specificity of 
the rules she proposes, her account offers the most promising practical guidance proposal 
of the three.  The promise of the proposal Hursthouse suggests derives from the more 
specific guidance that the variety of prescriptions for virtuous action and proscriptions 
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against vicious actions provide.  In this way, not only does the view provide a general 
action guidance principle based on one’s conception of the virtuous, but also picks out 
familiar sorts of activities that one should or should not do in order to become more 
virtuous. 
Yet, although the practical guidance proposal Hursthouse outlines shows the most 
promise of offering ordinary agents the sort of guidance the most reasonable version of 
the practical guidance objection suggests, it too falls short of providing agents the sort of 
guidance required for virtue.  For example, to use V-rules, one would need an extensive 
understanding of the concept of ‘justice’, ‘courage’, etc. with the other virtues to 
understand how to be just or courageous in a particular situation.84  These practical 
precepts lack practical guidance precise enough to indicate the action an agent should 
perform, unless the deliberating agent already understands which situational features to 
pick out as relevant to her deliberation.  Without knowing which sorts of general 
considerations a person of virtuous character might consider in processing these features, 
and which sorts of affective responses the virtuous would experience, and how these 
translate into action, an ordinary agent is unlikely to realize the virtuous activity these 
guidance schemata seem to be designed for agents to realize.  If these exhaust the set of 
tools virtue ethics has available to both guide action and maintain the structure of the 
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 On page 58 of On Virtue Ethics, Hursthouse claims that many of the virtues are well-
enough defined to get act-prescriptions, but that justice is a notable exception.  Given the 
range of terms she sees as virtue-terms, e.g. honesty, compassion, etc., it is likely that 
most of the classic five virtues would be “exceptional” in the same was justice is on her 
view, bringing back the spectre of the V-rules being of little use to all except moral 
experts. 
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theory, it seems that this form of practical guidance is vulnerable to a substantive 
application problem. 
Although this seems a plausible response in defense of virtue ethics’ practical 
precepts and guidance suggestions, these further problems with guidance indicate a 
sustained gap between what the theory can plausibly offer agents and at least implicit 
expectations of the practical guidance critique.  Yet, that ethical theory has problems 
reaching the ground does not imply that because the practical guidance critique does not 
identify virtue ethics uniquely, it lacks purchase against the view.  Even if offering agents 
practical guidance does not require delineating an algorithm for deliberation about action, 
an ethical theory aimed at affecting action should offer means by which the agent can 
identify the salient features of the situation and show how those features connect to 
ethical considerations more broadly.  The extent to which an agent still must interpret 
virtue-based action guidance precepts in order to implement them the central problem of 
the practical guidance critique still stands.  In spite of the practical precepts a theory 
might generate, an ethical theory that does not address the connections between action 
guidance, moral judgment, discernment, and deliberation is incomplete. 
Due to this gap between what the view specifies and good action, even 
Hursthouse’s view falls short of the reasonable version of the practical guidance 
objection.  Without a means of implementing the practical precepts and action guidance 
principle, an agent can at best act in accordance with virtue, but less likely be acting from 
virtue.  Because, ultimately, the aim is for the agent to act authentically, from character 
traits built through their own endorsed habits, with agents finding salient relevant features 
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of the circumstances and deliberating well about how to act, given those features, even an 
extensive action-guidance schema falls short from the sort of guidance that action from 
virtue requires. 
Despite meeting plausible theory-focused guidance constraints, these commonly 
cited Neo-Aristotelian guidance schemata fail to provide the sort of guidance at the heart 
of the practical guidance critique.  Although moderate practical guidance expectations of 
ethical theory seem both reasonable and maximal without resorting to arbitrary or 
otherwise unjustified constraints on action guidance, they are insufficient for effecting the 
sort of action guidance for which they are designed.  The practical guidance critique 
challenges virtue ethics because it does not provide this, suggesting either a deficiency in 
the theory or the constraints of the practical guidance critique that needs to be remedied. 
Guidance and Diversity of Aims85  
The distinction among the various purposes for which we might develop ethical 
theory provides some evidence that even if there is a quite good guidance schema, it may 
not be sufficient for providing agents the sort of action guidance that would realize the 
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 Ensuring that application comports with the broader aims of the theory need not 
involve an articulation of the broader aims at the application level, it need only realize 
them.  However, one might argue that Utilitarianism and Kantian accounts have a ready 
foothold on the action guidance issue, even if not readily applicable, it is a better 
approach to develop than by thinking that the axiology should be focused at the action 
level.  Thus, even if there are questions about what counts as a good consequence or what 
maxim expresses the purpose for which the action is done, the debate begins at the action 
level.  Virtue ethics’ resistance to codification even at the level of developing a right-
making account of action, leaves the already extensive debate about the substance of 
improving action far behind the other theories because the actions prescribed need to be 
justified at the level of particulars and, bypassing the act-based evaluative criteria, are 
evaluated with respect to the virtue-level qualities they express. 
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axiological aims of the theory.  If we distinguish among the theoretical commitments, 
practical precepts, and methods of guidance a theory can sustain, it becomes clearer that a 
comprehensive ethical theory involves not only theoretical foundations and 
corresponding practical precepts, but a means of implementation as well.   
In this section, I aim to argue that instead of rejecting the guidance proposal 
Hursthouse introduces, we should seek a supplemental intermediary, an implementation 
method of guidance.  For example, R.E. Bales articulates the distinction among various 
purposes for which we might develop an account, stating that, 
providing an account of right-making characteristics is still not the same 
thing as providing an account of the considered judgments of informed, 
mature persons in their disinterested, reflective moments, nor is it the 
same thing as providing a decision-making procedure.86 
Maintaining this distinction among various aims housed within a comprehensive ethical 
theory, we can evaluate the various features of a theory based on the aims they seek to 
meet and their compatibility with other components.  
We might note that the most effective way to meet the aims set forth by the 
axiology of the theory or a right-making account of action, might require a theory rely on 
a theory-independent means of guidance.  It is possible that the decision-making method 
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 Bales, 261.  He further notes that, “a theory (like act-utilitarianism) could satisfy one of 
[those] expectations…and yet fail to satisfy others of the expectations.” Bales, R. E.  
“Act-Utilitarianism:  Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making 
Procedure?”  American Philosophical Quarterly.  Volume 8, Nubmer 3, July 1971.  Pp. 
257-265.  Quotation from p. 261.   
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for realizing the axiological aims of a theory functions separately from evaluative criteria, 
derives from separate means, and is evaluated not based on the means by which it guides 
actions, but instead by whether it realizes the axiological aims of a theory.87  If it is 
possible to separate the theory and the guidance in this way, then it seems to be a mistake 
to assume that any single articulation of an ethical theory needs to meet the full range of 
expectations at once.88   
Because the range of possible aims for which an articulation of a theory may be 
developed is extensive, the practical guidance critique cannot plausibly demand more 
than compatibility among articulations of the various facets of an ethical theory involved 
in guiding action.89  Yet, a guidance method developed primarily for realizing the 
axiological aims of a theory might do so effectively by not making reference to the 
axiological aims or terms of the theory.  This diversity of means theories might develop, 
and by which agents could realize the aims of the theory, suggests the viability of a 
pluralism of methods by which agents might be able to meet the axiological aims of a 
theory.  That various facets of theory are assessable by different means does not rule out 
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 Although this may seem to be a very weak standard, given that few aim to articulate a 
comprehensive ethical theory and often single articulations of an account begin from 
diverse assumptions, developing a comprehensive ethical theory is still a significant a 
challenge, even with this seemingly weak standard. 
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a theory or sets of practical precepts that adequately guide. However, we need to assess 
theories based on theoretical constraints, limit standards of assessment of practical 
precepts to psychological plausibility and theoretical consistency, and develop 
appropriate means of assessing action-guidingness on its own merits, e.g. effectiveness at 
meeting practical guidance expectations.  Even though practical precepts are plausible 
means of guidance and do seem at least prima facie weakly guiding, we need to assess 
effectiveness of implementation measures for action guidance schemata relative to the 
aims of affecting action.90 
 Without actual and justified methods of guidance or comprehensive and 
theoretical evaluative measure, proponents of virtue ethics have little reason to develop 
virtue ethics in a way such that it meets the guidance standards of a practical guidance 
critique that heavily discount non-theory-focused practical guidance.  In addition, there 
are reasons to think we should not aim to develop a particular method of guidance for a 
theory absent adequate empirical grounding.  Yet, if these distinct aims are housed within 
the same theoretical structure or comprehensive ethical theory we might think that a 
comprehensive ethical theory need only be coherent among the various facets, rather than 
seek a sort of systematic guidance focused on principles or general precepts the theory 
generates as a form of guidance.   
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 One views that addresses this sort of issue, and which I will consider in the discussion 
of plausible expectations of an ethical theory, is O. Flanagan’s view regarding the 
psychological plausibility in Varieties of Moral Personality. Flanagan, Owen J. 1991. 
Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
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Without a good reason for thinking that axiological aims of a theory are 
empirically effective as implementation means, expecting theory-oriented constraints to 
serve as adequate methodological constraints is to overextend the expectations of the 
theory. However, by expanding moderate practical guidance expectations to 
accommodate assessment of theory and practical precepts, but also implementation 
method, we might be able to better assess a theory for it’s ability to offer agents effective 
practical guidance.  
Common expectations for both theory-focused and independent guidance methods 
are that they fit within the side constraints of the theory and meet minimal psychological 
plausibility expectations.  For example, a guidance method for virtue ethics needs to meet 
axiological aims of the theory, but do so in a way such that the particular remains primary 
in justification of action.  Further, any guidance method needs to fall within at least the 
minimal constraints of psychological plausibility, e.g., comport with Flanagan’s Principle 
of Minimal Psychological Realism, which constrains assumptions and expectations about 
behavior, deliberation, and character by the nature of those for which the view is 
developed.91  Yet, both the side constraints of virtue ethics and the psychological 
plausibility expectation seem to leave open an overly-broad set of guidance methods, 
particularly considering the variety of practices and learning methods people often 
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employ for moral development.  Although alone they do not offer limits narrow enough 
to produce guidance effective for realizing the aims of the theory, they do delineate the 
range of methods and type of guidance means.   
A corollary of affecting action derives from the basic justifications for the 
practical guidance critique itself, that ethical theory aim ultimately at guiding action.  
This, combined with an expanded definition of moral agency, suggests that an ethical 
theory should be applicable not only to an elite group of agents, but ordinary agents as 
well. Although agents who are brought up well and have the external goods needed for 
developing virtue will not require a widely accessible means of guidance, reaching an 
expansive audience suggests that a theory develop a more extensive application regimen 
to realize the aim of affecting action for the relevant group of agents.   If we expect that 
ethical theories guide, and that guidance be accessible to all moral agents, then virtue 
ethics applies to a wider audience than previous times in history.92   
As the current and widespread acceptance of human rights suggests, if the theory 
is intended to apply to a broad set of agents in addition to those already responsive to 
certain reasons, then finding ways to develop good character and actions for this broad 
range of agents may pose an interesting and significant challenge to the view.  Helping 
agents develop good character on this view might require providing agents with a variety 
of external goods, e.g., the right sorts of experiences which may in turn require a certain 
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 This sort of expectation is plausibly grounded if we adopt the assumption that an 
ethical theory affect action for moral agents in combination with a common notion of 
moral agent that encompasses something like “all competent adults”. 
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measure of external goods, or skills, such as literacy of various sort, specific types of 
material goods, etc.  Although these corollary challenges do not tell against virtue ethics 
per se, it does seem that the challenges of developing a codified decision-making 
procedure are replaced with a different set of challenges.  In spite of this, this set of 
challenges is preferable to the unreasonable expectations of a stringent practical guidance 
critique and offers more promise of ensuring good action because it is within the purview 
of virtue ethics to offer a moral development schema, whereas codified action guidance 
fits within the scope of the theory less comfortably.93  If we adopt these methods and 
guidance constraints, it seems plausible to an implementation method in addition to, 
rather than as a replacement for, Hursthouse’s guidance schema.  Not only does this offer 
more likely adequate guidance as a comprehensive ethical theory, it seems that if we 
allow for a pluralism of features of an ethical theory, the implementation means need 
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 What accessibility amounts to, however, is an interesting question in terms of 
evaluation.  In part, the problem is that deliberation, discernment, and practical reasoning 
more broadly are primarily internal activities.  In this sense, it is unclear what a theory or 
even method can do to be more accessible.  In a sense, it requires a least common 
denominator approach.  If the aim is to guide ordinary agents, it seems too stringent to 
require extensive exposure to moral theory or literacy at all, or even deliberation about 
applied ethics policies.  In the case of virtue ethics, the main aim is to have agents 
deliberate well about what is good to do, given the circumstances, but with an eye to what 
is good to do overall.  This does not seem to require that agents have read Aristotle’s 
work or the work of his contemporary predecessors.  
Although this may seem mundane and fails to constrain the particular type of 
method required (as we might think it is a reason for codification), it has non-trivial 
implications for developing a guidance method for a theory. Although this cannot 
guarantee a method that could serve as a systematic way to attain virtue, studies from 
social psychology concerning the nature and types of character, relations between social 
circumstances, actions, and character [what Mill referred to as “ethology”], experimental 
philosophical queries about moral deliberation and judgments people tend to make, given 
situations framed in a particular manner, e.g.. 
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only be compatible with the whole and adequate itself for the purposes it is aimed to 
serve. 
Conclusion: 
 Although three common approaches to practical guidance from neo-Aristotelian 
virtue ethics develop guidance schemata, each fall short of the standard practical 
guidance objection that claims a theory should effect action and guide the ordinary agent.  
Of the three main proposals, Rosalind Hursthouse proposes the most promising schema 
in On Virtue Ethics, providing agents with a virtue-based action guidance principle as 
well as v-rules that circumscribe action further by prescribing or proscribing actions as 
respectively virtuous or vicious.  Yet, without a way to demonstrate to agents the purpose 
of following these v-rules, acting from them not only in accordance with them, even this 
schema leaves a gap between the specific prescriptions and proscriptions and ordinary 
agents. 
Because theoretical accounts need an intermediary between theory and virtuous 
activity if they are to be implemented, a comprehensive ethical theory needs to provide a 
supplement to the guidance schema that supplies an implementation method for 
inculcating these precepts in ways that allow agents to make them their own.  Without it, 
even an extensive guidance schema like the one Hursthouse proposes lacks a method for 
interpreting the significance of features of a situation with respect to the axiological 
claims of the theory.  In addition to this basic expectation for method, the assumptions of 
the practical guidance critique that at least implicitly expect the theory to be applicable to 
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a wide range of agents suggests an additional corollary that the methods of guidance be 
widely accessible. 
In the next chapter, I argue that we should explore practices, socially-situated, 
complex activities engaged by virtuous practitioners, as plausible implementation method 
for virtue ethics.  I argue that because practices demonstrate to individuals how mundane 
activities an ordinary agent engages realize values the community shares, they enrich and 
develop the deliberative skills that practical wisdom requires.  Further, not only are 
practices accessible to a wide range of agents, empirical evidence from studies of 
expertise and expert performance suggest that their structure makes them to some extent 
amenable to empirical assessment using tools of social demography social psychology, 
cognitive psychology, and other empirical means of evaluation relevant for empirical and 
experimental philosophy. 
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Chapter 3 
Practice-Based Guidance 
If we seek to provide ordinary agents with practical guidance, we need a means of 
implementing the ethical theories we endorse.  However, this is an especially challenging 
task for virtue ethics because of its resistance to codified action guidance.  Although we 
can outline practical precepts and even an action guidance principle for virtue ethics, 
without a means for ordinary agents to implement this guidance, the account fails to meet 
a reasonable expectation of the sort of guidance an ethical theory should provide. 
 I argue that practices offer a promising means of implementing the axiology and 
practical precepts of virtue ethics.  As introduced and defined in the contemporary 
context by Alasdair MacIntyre, practices, socially-structured, complex activities, situated 
within a society that values virtue, implement virtuous activity for agents, and bridge the 
gap between the non-virtuous and the virtuous.  Practices provide both an account of how 
the right-making account of action and practical precepts lead to virtuous activity, and 
offer a method for implementing them.  Practices make salient the values the activity 
realizes and the point of the activity in ways that even extensive action guidance 
schemata focused on theoretical claims do not.  In this way, they help agents realize 
virtuous activity and comport with the values of the community. 
 Studies of expertise and expert performance suggest that the discernment and 
deliberative skill required for virtuous activity parallels the sort of abilities experts 
develop, and that the two may be developed in much the same way through practices and 
domains, respectively.  Because practices connect an agent’s activities within the practice 
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with the purposes for which they are engaged, they offer novice agents a means of 
understanding how these activities lead to and express virtue and provide a method for 
implementing neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics.  Further, practices serve to supplement 
guidance schemata aimed developed for meeting the practical guidance objection by 
making it possible for novices to develop the rudiments of practical wisdom and virtue.    
MacIntyre’s Practice View 
 In his After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre sketches one of the few, and perhaps the 
most fully-articulated, contemporary accounts of ethics involving practices.  Practices, on 
MacIntyre’s account, ground a tripartite ethical structure, and are understood in the 
context of one’s life narrative.  On this account, practices are constrained by the various 
historical traditions that underwrite the various social roles that an individual develops a 
personal narrative to integrate.  Although they require normative grounding, I argue that 
the practices MacIntyre delineates on his account can be used as a guidance method that 
satisfies moderate practical guidance expectations.  Further, practices provide the sort of 
structured context through which agents can develop the deliberative expertise 
characteristic of practical wisdom. 
 MacIntyre’s practice view derives from a concern about the pervasiveness of 
emotivist ethical views in today’s society.  Based on an historical argument detailing the 
combination of fragmented and decontextualized understanding of ancient accounts of 
ethics, MacIntyre argues that our endorsement of these views leaves us with inadequate 
grounds for deciding a good way to live our lives due to a faulty reliance on modern 
moral notions.  By way of remedy, MacIntyre envisions a return to a virtue-oriented 
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account based on the assumption that we are situated within a social context that 
influences our understanding and use of normative terms, with the implication that 
contemporary liberal societies require radical change to support the sorts of practices and 
communities that could foster virtues in this way. 
This account MacIntyre proposes is rooted in practices, activities that gain 
significance in one’s life in the process of developing a narrative unity through which one 
integrates the various particularities of one’s life.  MacIntyre defines a practice as, 
 [A]ny coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence 
which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, 
with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.94 
On his account, practices are important because virtues are expressed most vividly, 
though not solely, through practices and are necessary to achieving the goods unique to 
any specific practice, the goods internal to that practice. 
On MacIntyre’s view, practices serve as the foundation on which to reconstruct a 
lost ethical approach, and as a place in which the expression of virtue is salient and 
within which one can realize its benefits.95  It is within practices that the virtues find their 
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“point and function.”96  Practices serve as the medium through which one embodies 
excellence and experiences goods internal to that particular form of activity.  A practice 
is thus a technical outline of the sorts of activity through which virtues are most readily 
expressed and which, in turn, rely on virtue for the achievement of internal goods. 
According to MacIntyre, practices, characterized as specifically human activities 
aimed at successful performance in a way that enables the advancement of the forms of 
the activity, and facilitates human abilities to understand the nature of the activity in ways 
that offer benefits to humans.  The view is aimed particularly at humans, identifying 
features commonly attributed to them; their social nature, the capacity for complex 
activities and understanding of abstract principles such as those that ground logic and 
enable them to rule out inconsistencies.  Although MacIntyre does not detail the level of 
complexity required for something to be considered a practice, he claims that, for 
example, practices can be distinguished from technical skills.  So, while architecture is a 
practice, bricklaying is not.  Likewise with farming and turnip-planting, chess and tic-tac-
toe.97  
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dynamic and evolving aims, while finite skills have a fixed aim such that the activity 
admits only of iterations, not evolution. 
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Extrapolating from MacIntyre’s account, practices, in part, seem to be comprised 
of an integrated series of skills, which engage social conventions, roles, and rules.  
Conventions, e.g., function as sorts of socially agreed-upon rules of thumb (either more 
formal, like driving on the right side of the road, or less formal, like etiquette rules) 
designed to serve as an efficient solution to a coordination problem of some sort.98  
Further, practices likely include roles for practitioners to assume, set by the institution 
within which the activities of the practice are realized organize the activities within the 
practice.  Although practices often employ several conventions as well as rules, these are 
distinct from what one might categorize as a practice proper, they help structure and 
organize the activity within the practice, and are neither necessarily constrained within, 
nor completely definitive of practices.99 Instead, internal goods that engagement with the 
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99On this account, practices are also distinguished from the more colloquial sense of 
‘practice’, which tends to mean something roughly like ‘habit’.  On my view, a practice is 
a much more consciously engaged, reflective, and complex endeavor.  A habit, in 
contrast, is more like an engrained way of thinking, perceiving, or behaving, one which 
often leads to identifiable patterns of behavior and action.  They become a sort of 
automatic response, triggered in a particular sort of situation, one that may be easy or 
difficult to override.  Although habits are often produced as a result of engaging a 
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activity of the practice produces, further distinguishes practices from technical skills that 
aim toward a fixed goal.   
According to MacIntyre, the goals of practices change as people engage them; 
they develop and are furthered as people innovate the techniques that allow for new ends 
to aim at.  This process, he argues, requires virtue to sustain this dynamic notion of an 
end, which is constituted in part by its means.  Standards play a dual role with respect to 
activity, one that parallels a feature of Aristotelian ethics in that the evaluation of an 
action is in part an explanation of why one should engage in it (or not, as the case may 
be).100  By aiming to realize these standards, practices engage the virtues and produce 
what MacIntyre calls “internal goods.”   
For MacIntyre, internal goods are goods whose ends are in some way inseparable 
from the means to achieving them, the activity of the practice.101  This notion of good 
contrasts with the idea of external goods, which are goods that one can attain in a number 
of ways, the sorts of goods which are typically counted in zero-sum terms.   Internal 
goods, however, are particular excellences or products realized only through the activity 
of a particular practice, goods that cannot be gained without engaging in the activity of 
the practice itself.  In addition, the realization of internal goods benefit the entire 
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community, furthers the practice, and extends the tradition.  In contrast to external goods, 
the realization of internal goods does not detract from another’s experience of the 
activity, but instead enhances it in important ways. 
Because of its connection with internal goods as well as its other roles within the 
normative schema MacIntyre proposes, on his view, practices can exist only in a society 
that values virtue in some way.  A society that didn’t value virtues of some sort could not 
sustain practices, as such, even if it had institutions that supported technical skills 
“mobilized for a unified purpose.”102  In part, this distinction relies on the fact that a 
technical skill has a fixed end, whereas the aims of the disciplines involved in practices 
are continually evolving, better approximating excellence in the activity.  As the practice 
advances, as the skills are mastered and subsequently extended by practitioners, the ends 
of the practice are furthered.  On MacIntyre’s account, virtues are an integral prerequisite 
for a practice, enabling it to prevent the corruption of the aims.  
Although in After Virtue MacIntyre does not detail the role virtue plays in 
realizing internal goods, he describes virtues within the context of a practice as, “just 
those qualities which tend to lead to the achievement of a certain class of goods [i.e. 
internal goods].”103  Even though we cannot live without some measure of external 
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goods, MacIntyre argues that sometimes the virtues and the achievement of internal 
goods can be an obstacle to acquiring some sorts or amounts of external goods.  Further, 
because the goods internal to practices rely on virtue to produce the unique benefits 
internal to and expressed within a practice, internal goods cannot be achieved without a 
social context which embodies the virtues.104 
A final necessary feature and primary form of social support for practices are the 
institutions that a society maintains and which house practices.  Institutions offer not only 
material support for practices, but are required as an intermediary between the values of 
society and practices.  In his discussion of the relation between institutions and practices, 
MacIntyre emphasizes the role institutions play in providing the material setting for the 
activity of practices to occur.  Further, institutions provide the social structure for 
practices and material continuity.  Although the acquisitive aims of institutions can be at 
odds with the achievement of internal goods within the practices they support; they 
provide material goods and structural support that practices require.105 
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 One distinction between something that can be considered a practice and a finite skill 
is that a practice admits of expertise and innovation in a way a skill or particular 
technique does not.  A technique or finite skill can be mastered and applied in various 
circumstances, but the skill alone does not admit of innovation, only multiplication.  
Although a variety of skills might be employed to complete a task, the activity of a skill 
itself does not change and grow with time.  Once a skill is mastered, it can be applied and 
applied in combination with various skills in novel ways, but it cannot be improved upon 
in the sense that it can be redefined, and yet still be considered the same, continuous skill.  
Practices admit of expertise and innovation in a sense similar to MacIntyre’s.  That is, 
they are a sort of discipline, and have a broader set of evolving aims than a finite skill 
itself. 
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Advantages of Practice-Based Guidance 
 Practices serve a plausible implementation method for virtue ethics, in two main 
ways.  One is by offering a structure through which agents can gain direct action 
guidance.  Practitioners within the institutions that house practices can serve to guide 
novice agents much the way ideal agency models might suggest, but within the context of 
a practice serve as a more accessible, yet likely non-expert source of guidance and advice 
to agents.  A second means by which practices guide is much less direct, but offers agents 
means by which they can develop the sorts of deliberative skills that are characteristic of 
practical wisdom.  Although not an immediately accessible means of good guidance, it 
eventually enables agents to solve practical problems well on their own.   
The promise of practice-based guidance derives from its ability to serve as an 
implementation method, offering even novice agents a method through which to correctly 
implement the precepts and principles of virtue ethics.106  Instead of offering theory-
focused guidance that challenges the contextualist constraints of virtue ethics, practices 
provide a structure integrating skills, conventions, aims and activities that can build 
deliberative proficiency with respect to the aims and standards specified by the practice 
over a broad range of situations.  Yet, practices can also meet moderate practical 
guidance expectations, offering agents guidance that is action-oriented, while offering 
ordinary agents means of developing more refined deliberative abilities. 
                                                 
 
106
 Practices can plausibly also serve as an implementation method for Utilitarian or 
Kantian Ethics as well, but I leave the work of developing practice-based ethics for 
different accounts to others.  My aim here is to develop the case for practices in 
conjunction with the commitments of virtue ethics. 
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The central challenge the practical guidance critique poses for virtue ethics is that 
it expects ethical theory to offer action guidance to agents, including ordinary agents.107  
The action guidance practical precepts like “Act as the virtuous would,” and advice to 
emulate or idealize the activities of more virtuous agents appears, prima facie 
psychologically plausible, the substantive guidance these precepts provide prove nearly 
vacuous for ordinary agents or agents deliberating in novel circumstances.  Practices, 
however, can accommodate not only expert agents well-versed in the variety of ways to 
act within the circumstances in order to meet the aim, but novice agents who first need to 
learn the rudiments of the discipline before managing in complex or ambiguous 
circumstances. 
With respect to a virtue view, even with the more specific guidance specified by 
V-Rules such as “act justly”, or, “be honest”, any guidance an agent is going to gain from 
rules of this form depend on her understanding of the thick terms of the rules, like justice, 
compassion, etc, and what they require, or deriving action guidance from character-
qualities.108  The virtue view requires extensive understanding of thick concepts, 
connections between character-level qualities and act-level qualities relating to 
                                                 
 
107
 By ‘ordinary agents’ here I mean agents who neither have specialized training in 
ethics, in the contemporary context, philosophers or theologians, nor would count as 
members of the elite group Aristotle took to be his audience.  Instead, I am interested to 
at least try to meet the at least tacit expectation of the practical guidance critique that 
ethical theory offer guidance to the ordinary, untutored agent. 
 
108
 Although the V-Rules Hursthouse puts forth make strides toward elaborating the sorts 
of considerations that agents seeking guidance should consider, the view itself seems to 
be a version of the ideal agency model, as it requires agents seeking guidance to reflect 
on the virtue qualities as a more ideal agent might. 
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discernment and deliberation to apply, leaving it weak with respect to an empirically 
adequate set of practical guidance expectations.  Because practices structure activities 
with respect to a set of definitive aims, engaging a practice allows agents to learn thick 
terms.  Further, ordinary agents can gain correction from more-experienced practitioners, 
and develop the rudiments of practical wisdom by refining means-ends reasoning in the 
service of both ultimate and more proximate aims set by the structure of the practice.  
This sort of structured experiential engagement allows practices to guide in ways that 
avoid the practical guidance difficulties faced by both theory-focused guidance and ideal 
agency models.  Further, practices at least appear more amenable to empirical assessment 
than other guidance schemata, suggesting an advantage over guidance provided by codes  
of theory-focused guidance alone. 
Practices, however, can guide novices due, in part, to the roles set up for agents to 
assume within the practices and the institutions that house practices.  As the primary 
problem with the issues of providing novice or ordinary agents practical guidance 
highlights, the novice agent is unlikely to realize the standards of excellence that 
MacIntyre characterizes as partially definitive of practices.  Within practices, roles 
corresponding to skill level could define the both complexity of the aims the agent must 
meet, as well as the sort of activities the agent should do to meet that aim.  In this way, 
the structure of a practice as situated within an institution can connect the highly 
constrained, but prerequisite aims to the broader aims which the novice is not yet 
equipped to meet, making novice activities that do not otherwise obviously aim directly 
to meet these standards of excellence, intelligible.  
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For example, the practice of gift-giving offers ordinary agents insights into the 
particular features of when, to whom, and what gifts to give others in their community. 
However, more importantly, the activity demonstrates to individuals the point of gift-
giving, and relevant values that it should, and if done well, realizes.  The values 
instantiated in good gift-giving, such as reciprocity or proportionality, offer agents within 
the practice not only a sense of which values are shared within the community, but also 
make manifest what sorts of activities instantiate those values within the context of that 
community.  Further, by instantiating those values, individuals are acting well, from the 
right reasons, and the right time.  Although these mundane activities, even done within 
the context of a practice, may not be sufficient to offer an agent a robust sense of what it 
means to be a just person, these precursors to justice are building blocks from which 
agents can develop an understanding of virtues and offer a distant approximation of the 
excellence. 
In addition to providing means of implementing the axiological commitments of a 
theory, practices suggest a more empirically adequate guidance approach than either 
theory-focused guidance or ideal agency guidance alone.  Beyond meeting a sort of thin 
empirical adequacy of possibility, or seeking guidance contingent on a variety of specific 
environmental supports, such as empathetic virtuous agents, extensive understanding of 
virtue terms in context, practices assume adequate social support for institutions as well 
as virtuous practitioners.  Further, proximity and connections between practices and 
institutions make practices particularly amenable to empirical evaluation because the 
structural format of offers ready tools of scientific evaluation.  Not only do institutions 
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highlight a population that can be observed and queried about their activities, but the 
methods endorsed and utilized within the practice can be evaluated and compared among 
different groups of people engaging the practice, as well as compare different sorts of 
practices.  Because the practitioners adhere to or at least purportedly endorse the aims of 
the practices, and perhaps also the institution, it picks out populations whose members 
seek to achieve the same types of goals. 
Practices and Practical Wisdom 
In addition to offering a structure within which agents can ascertain guidance, the 
process of engaging and progressing toward the aims of a practice inculcates in the agent 
the deliberative skills that practical wisdom requires.  In this section, I aim to argue that 
the skills required to proceed toward the standards of excellence of practices requires of 
agents deliberative skills that are self-similar to those of the practically wise.  Further, if 
these are self-similar abilities, then not only do practices have prima facie relevance as an 
action guidance method with respect to guiding ordinary agents, and thereby meeting the 
standards of the practical guidance critique, but are particularly important for developing 
the sorts of action guidance skills specific to virtue ethics.  Although the relatively 
narrow purview of paradigm practices lack the breadth of aims that practical wisdom 
spans, the sort of deliberative abilities and methods by which they are attained, suggest 
practices may be a necessary component, or at least a common component, of a life well 
lived. 
Practice-based guidance is a promising alternative to theory-based guidance and 
ideal agency models because it housed within a well-defined structure that supports an 
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implementation method for a set of aims that an institution grounds and which the 
practitioners attempt to realize.  Even though typical practices are well-defined and span 
a relatively narrow scope, it seems at least possible that a practice could be used to 
structure activities aimed at realizing more expansive aims like those definitive of a sort 
of all-encompassing practice, e.g. a practice of living well.  Further, in spite of lacking 
the sort of all-encompassing breadth that fits the sorts of aims ethical theories propound, 
practice-based guidance is a promising alternative to theory-based guidance and ideal 
agency models because the guidance it offers at least prima facie appears more 
empirically adequate with respect to meeting the standards of excellence than the other 
approaches offer.109  
Yet, with respect to virtue ethics, practices offer an additional benefit.  Not only 
do they offer an answer to the action guidance question, “What should one do?”, but offer 
a structure within which agents can grapple with the deliberative process that requires 
them to engage both the particular features of the situation and the broader aims of the 
practice in choosing how to act.  Because practices require agents to choose among 
various action options in order to meet some sort of concrete goal grounded within the 
broader aims of the practice, the sorts of skills agents develop as they engage and 
progress through a practice share the features of the sort of deliberative skill that is 
definitive of practical wisdom.  This not only respects the role of practical wisdom in 
                                                 
109
 The characterization of practical wisdom articulated here is derived from Aristotle’s 
discussion of practical wisdom from EN, Book VI. 
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virtue ethics, but also offers a possible means by which the deliberative skill 
characteristic of practical wisdom might be trained.   
Practical wisdom, a type of excellence in choice, requires agents to understand the 
relationships between the particular and universal to realize good action. Although the 
particulars and aims that must be accounted for are wide-ranging and numerous, by 
experience, agents come to understand the relations among them to consistently choose 
well.  Unlike the theoretical knowledge of abstract concepts that define a relation that can 
be easily grasped, practical reasoning requires not only understanding the general 
relations, but also recognizing how they can be brought about both in general and in the 
individual case. 
Thus, the sort of action guidance virtue ethics seeks to produce in agents is not 
only of the immediate and concrete sort that the practical guidance critique makes its 
focus.  Instead, action guidance for agents derives also from long-developed capacities 
for living well, developed through extensive experience with the particulars.  In part, this 
extensive experience is required because there are many ways to go wrong.  Because a 
skilled practical reasoner recognizes more quickly and accurately which particulars and 
universals are the relevant ones in the situation, he or she can direct the agent to find 
more effective ways to deliberate about action.  Practices appear a prima facie plausible 
way to train these deliberative capacities.    
Standards of excellence definitive of the practice are not obviously met by the 
activities of beginners, but by those who have much experience within the practice.  In 
addition, many practices proceed by engaging with and learning from more skilled 
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practitioners.  The mentor need not be an expert within the practice, but only have more 
extensive experience and a more refined understanding of the aims of the activities and 
the relevant features and considerations relating to choice in action.  Yet, even so, the 
mentors within a practice have developed enough of the relevant habits and skills to 
navigate among the particulars to meet the sorts of aims the less-skilled practitioner holds 
in that role.  As the practitioner proceeds through the practice, the habits and skills enable 
the agent to realize more distant aims.  In this way, practices offer a structure within 
which the novice can train to align the particulars with the universals via deliberation and 
realized in action by offering more-skilled practitioners who can correct the agents in 
their mistakes, and highlight particular techniques and strategies that help the agent. 
 One benefit of practices is that they make intelligible various activities involved 
in training agents in the prerequisite techniques, strategies—the basic skills upon which 
expertise in the practice is built.  By organizing the various activities that are required to 
realize these standards of excellence, but which are far-removed from the sort of 
activities that are indicative of excellence, even if these are indispensable prerequisites.  
Thus, even if practices do not offer this sort of deliberative ability to agents immediately 
upon entering into a discipline as a practitioner, practices offer methods by which to train 
agents with the skills necessary to realize these aims and the nature of practices is such 
that they offer direct and tailored guidance and correction to agents so that they can learn 
to valuate the particulars and orient their actions to the aims, in successively more 
challenging and complex combinations of situation and aim, but beginning with highly 
constrained, more simple problems about which to deliberate. 
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A sort of deliberative excellence, wherein the practitioner is able not only to meet 
the standards of excellence of the discipline, but can see in the limits future directions for 
innovation, seems plausibly the result of extensive engagement in a practice.  One who 
has developed this is described in much the way the practically wise are, but with more 
narrowly situated and better-defined aims, who can readily negotiate the particulars and 
aims to realize the excellent activities.  Yet, even at the level of mastery, the experts 
within a practice often challenge and redefine the aims in the way MacIntyre’s practices 
suggest with their dynamic notion of an end.  Although narrow domains relative to the 
aim of living well toward which practical wisdom, the sorts of deliberative skills 
developed in practices share the qualities with practical wisdom, even if on a much 
smaller scale, and suggest that practices develop self-similar abilities in agents, and might 
thus be an important part of a life well lived, even if engaging practices is not sufficient 
for living well. 
Further, virtue ethics acknowledges the roles time, experience, and effort, play in 
agents developing practical wisdom.110  Distinct from the way we learn theoretical 
wisdom, practical wisdom requires extensive experience and training, suggesting an 
advantage to adopting the practice-based view of guidance over a view that focuses 
primarily on adherence to a narrow code of action guidance rules.  Although a theory-
                                                 
 
110
 This is an interesting point to note with respect to the expectation that a theory train 
the ordinary.  If one thinks that Aristotle’s view is flawed because it is directed toward an 
elite audience, it is interesting to note on a practices view becoming virtuous, even for the 
elite, is not without effort.  Although a high standard of living and being brought up well 
may be required, attaining virtue also requires extensive concentrated effort. 
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focused approach might be plausible for guiding an agent who is experienced in 
discerning the relevant particulars and their connections to the ends, it is of little use to 
the ordinary agents the practical guidance critique is concerned with guiding.  Practices 
seem to offer a means by which agents can bring the particulars into conversation with 
the aims and learn the relations among them, thickening concepts by finding their 
instances in situations and understanding the relations between the various features, the 
situations, the actions, and how they affect one’s choice in action. 
Expertise as Non-Moral Analogue 
In addition to theoretical considerations relating to the potential benefits of 
practices as a means of guidance, studies of relative expertise provide indirect empirical 
support for practices as a means of action guidance that might satisfy not only 
expectations of a moderate practical guidance critique, but comports with the 
development of typically virtue ethical excellence in choice, practical wisdom.  I aim to 
delineate some of the structural parallels between expert performance and practical 
wisdom, arguing that these structural parallels suggest possible developmental parallels 
as well.  Further, the means by which expertise is developed in the narrower context 
parallels practices in a way that suggests indirect empirical support for practices as a 
means of action guidance, and the sort of deliberative skill that characterizes practical 
wisdom. 
 Studies of expertise and how it is developed provide stronger evidence that 
practices could be empirically adequate.  Descriptions of the deliberative qualities 
expressed by the practically wise, as integrated and refined understanding of how the 
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universals bears on the particulars of the situation, bear a striking resemblance to the 
mastery of deliberative skills definitive of expertise as a source of deliberative mastery in 
various non-moral domains.  Parallels between the sorts of mastery required for excellent 
deliberative activity and expert performance suggest not only a surface resemblance of 
the ways of discerning and deliberating between the two, but also extensive training as a 
shared means of acquisition.  Descriptions of both expertise and practical wisdom, and 
empirical data regarding the means by which expertise is developed, suggest an integral 
role for the guidance methods characteristic of practices. 
Expertise is a critical feature of an empirically adequate virtue ethical account, 
because it highlights the extent to which training is required as well as the limits of 
natural talent and the narrowness of reasoning skill.   As evidenced in the expertise 
literature, expertise is developed by taking a basic set of learned skills, then learning to 
apply them in combination based on exposure to a vast array of situations, working to 
solve challenging, but attainable, problems, and by engaging in a concentrated effort to 
develop frameworks that make sense of the situations.111  The situational exposure allows 
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  The deliberate practice feature that gives rise to expert performance has been studied 
extensively by Ericsson. Ericsson, K. A. 2006. “The Influence of Experience and 
Deliberate Practice on the Development of Superior Expert Performance.” In The 
Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance, ed. Robert R. Hoffman. 
New York, NY US: Cambridge University Press.  Pp. 683-703, Ericsson, K.A. 1996. The 
Road to Excellence: The Acquisition of Expert Performance in the Arts and Sciences, 
Sports, and Games. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.; Ericsson, K. A., Ralf 
T. Krampe, and Clemens Tesch-Römer. 1993. “The Role of Deliberate Practice in the 
Acquisition of Expert Performance.” Psychological Review 100 (3) (07): 363-406.; 
Ericsson, K. A., and A. C. Lehmann. 1996. “Expert and Exceptional Performance: 
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one to set up frames to categorize information in long-term memory to make sense of 
scenarios as they see them.  For example a novice, one who has the basic skills, but has 
not yet applied them either in many iterations or in many different situations, can often 
reason through the scenario, but makes more mistakes in judgment and takes longer to 
make the decisions than those with expertise and more experience applying the various 
skills. 
In the next two sections, I aim to argue that significant parallels between the 
structure of relative expertise and the means by which it develops corroborate the Neo-
Aristotelian virtue ethics account of decision-making as relating to practical wisdom.  
Further, the data lend support to the notion that expertise is developed within a context 
much like practices.  If these parallels do indicate a working analogy, then we might be 
able to use the findings of the expertise literature to develop better, more closely tailored 
action guidance available to agents, by working within a training structure that is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Evidence of Maximal Adaptation to Task Constraints.” Annual Review of Psychology 47: 
273-305.   
Further, although it is unclear that the various posited frameworks are compatible, 
a common explanation for expert performance, shared across several domains, is that 
within the domain the person developing the abilities required for expert performance 
develop frameworks of some sort of represent domain-specific information and its 
relations.  Studies indicate that these representations are stored in long-term memory, yet 
allows rapid storage and retrieval from these structures.  Further, as they encounter new 
experiences and challenges, they alter these frameworks to more accurately represent the 
information. E.g. Gobet, Fernand, and Herbert A. Simon. 1996. “Templates in Chess 
Memory: A Mechanism for Recalling Several Boards.” Cognitive Psychology 31 (1) (08): 
1-40.; Ericsson, K. A., Ralf T. Krampe, and Clemens Tesch-Römer. 1993. “The Role of 
Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance.” Psychological Review 100 
(3) (07): 363-406.; and Chi, Michelene T. H., Feltovich, Paul, and Robert Glazer. 1981.  
“Categorization and Representation of Physics Problems by Experts and Novices” in 
Cognitive Science, 5:  121-152.  
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isomorphic to that which trains expertise, deliberate practice within a domain.  To the 
extent that these parallels indicate both an analogue between the phenomena and what 
seem to be isomorphic training regimens, the empirical data regarding expertise may help 
inform our understandings of practices and whether we should further explore practice-
based guidance as a means by which agents can fulfill the expectations of the practical 
guidance critique. 
Structure of Expertise  
Descriptions of practical wisdom and characterizations of the structure of relative 
expertise share striking parallels.  In this section I aim to delineate some of these 
structural parallels between relative expertise and practical wisdom.  Specifically, 
commonalities between practical wisdom and expertise studied as a behavioral trait, the 
problem-solving abilities of experts demonstrate, disparities in situational awareness 
abilities of experts and novices, and experts as having cultivated their special abilities 
rather than inheriting them, suggest an analogue between the phenomena.   
Early studies of expertise were based on a common assumption about stand-out 
performers, that expertise derives almost directly from natural talent, and those stand-out 
performers are merely expressing a trait or gift with which they were born.  However, 
more recent studies have tended to converge on the notion that expertise is relative in 
important ways.  Instead of studying the biography of talented individuals, relative 
expertise compares experts to novices, and assumes that expertise is a sort of ability 
conferred largely in the same ways, primarily through acquisition and organization of 
knowledge, reasoning, and ways of representing experience available to a wide range of 
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individuals.112  Because excellent performance is not always closely correlated with 
factors like being recognized by peers or within a profession as an expert, cognitive 
psychologists aiming to isolate and evaluate expertise focus on actual, consistent, 
superior performance in competition or representative domain-specific tasks.113 
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 Further, relative expertise is not only based on social or professional reputation, 
amount of education, or by meeting the ten-year rule of extended experience within a 
domain (see Chi, Michelene T. H., Robert Glaser, and Marshall J. Farr. 1988. The Nature 
of Expertise. Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates.).  Although relative expertise is 
quite variable with respect to the level of skill it involves (i.e. anyone who is not a novice 
at a particular skill or set of skills could count as more expert), by ‘expert’, even in the 
relative sense here, I mean the term ‘expert’ in the sense of mastery of the activities 
within a domain as opposed to someone quite proficient who is in the ‘arrested 
development’ stage, whereby many of their skills are automatic, yet the automaticity is 
not challenged or reworked, and leads the agent to routine mistakes that the expert who 
has not automatized those skills, is able to correct and improve their abilities beyond that 
high level of proficiency. (See Ericsson, K. A. 2006. “The Influence of Experience and 
Deliberate Practice on the Development of Superior Expert Performance.” In The 
Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance, ed. Robert R. Hoffman. 
New York, NY US: Cambridge University Press.  Pp. 683-703). See also Chi, Michelene 
T. H. 2006. “Two Approaches to the Study of Experts' Characteristics.” In The 
Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance. ed. Robert R. Hoffman, 
New York, NY US: Cambridge University Press.  Pp. 21-30. p. 23. 
However, it is worth noting that there are things to learn from the absolute 
approach, the sort of longevity studies that characterize the lives of experts.  My point 
here is only that the literature that is most relevant for developing the initial parallels is 
that housed/most accessible in the relative expertise literature. 
In addition, although I aim to constrain the parallels primarily to practical 
wisdom, it seems likely that practical wisdom and virtue might be analogues of expertise 
and expert performance, where expertise is that ability that is exercised, and expert 
performance is the measurable expression of it.  
 
113Chi claims that, "the goal of studying relative expertise is not merely to describe and 
identify the ways in which experts excel.  Rather the goal is to understand how experts 
became that way so that others can learn to become more skilled and knowledgeable." 
(Chi, Michelene T. H. 2006. “Two Approaches to the Study of Experts' Characteristics.” 
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Among the striking parallels descriptions of expertise and descriptions of practical 
wisdom are that individuals possessing the sort of integrated understanding and organized 
knowledge of expertise are selected for study based on their expressed behavioral traits.  
A behavioral trait, described by John Horn and Hiromi Masunaga as, “a characteristic 
that persistently distinguishes one individual from another despite variation in the 
circumstances in which individuals are found,”114 parallels the unit of evaluation by 
which virtue ethics identifies and assesses good individuals, the character trait.  Like 
character traits, they exhibit both dynamic and stable qualities, and they also exhibit the 
same broader pattern of expression and serve as a means by which we can distinguish 
among various abilities and levels of mastery an individual has attained, even though the 
individual actions may vary widely among individuals.115 
Experts, as identified by their behavior traits are distinguished from novices and 
other non-experts by demonstrating excellent task performance within a specific domain.  
What distinguishes experts from novices in the context of relative expertise, as measured 
                                                                                                                                                 
In The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance. ed. Robert R. 
Hoffman, New York, NY US: Cambridge University Press.  Pp. 21-30. p. 23.)  If those 
concerned with practical guidance for ethical theory in fact assume that it should be 
accessible to ordinary agents, there seems to be further reason to consider relative 
expertise and what it might be able to illuminate about the process of developing 
behavioral traits. 
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 Horn, John, and Hiromi Masunaga. 2006. “A Merging Theory of Expertise and 
iIntelligence.” In The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance. ed. 
Robert R. Hoffman. New York, NY US: Cambridge University Press.  Pp. 587-611.  P.  
588. 
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 Horn and Masunaga use factor analysis to identify these features and claim that the 
traits they identify are probabilistic patterns of behavior, which allows for variability in 
actual actions performed, yet stability in traits identified.  (Ibid, p. 588). 
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empirically, by consistently solving problems or performing representative domain-
specific tasks with greater accuracy and speed than novices, or even highly-proficient 
subjects presented with the same tasks to perform or problems to solve.  Because novices 
cannot perform these tasks with the same accuracy and speed, particularly with regard to 
complex problem-solving, or on tasks that require especially quick reflex reactions to 
situational factors, researchers who study expertise posit that experts develop 
representations to organize information gathered from past scenarios to anticipate the 
possible future conditions instead of reacting to the situation alone. 
This ability to anticipate future states of affairs highlights a further parallel 
between expertise and practical wisdom--the role situational awareness plays both in 
deliberating well, and as an indicator of expertise.  In the expertise literature, situational 
awareness is studied vividly in the context of aircraft piloting and sports, domains in 
which success depends heavily on good visual perception.  However, the sorts of skills 
that characterize situational awareness in these visually-oriented domains resonate with 
the indicators of expertise in other contexts as well, such as expert decision-making.116   
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 On page 649, Endsley makes a similar point, explaining the resonance by noting that, 
“SA [situational awareness] has been part of integral to many of the domains in which 
expertise has been historically studied, even if it has not been specifically identified as 
such.”  She finds it to be particularly important to better understanding expert 
performance as, “a focal point around which experts integrate the information they gather 
in order to perform their tasks.” (quotations both from, Endsley, Mica R. 2006. 
“Expertise and Situation Awareness.” In The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and 
Expert Performance. ed. Robert R. Hoffman. New York, NY US: Cambridge University 
Press. Pp. 633-651. P. 649).  See also Chi, Michelene T. H. 2006. “Two Approaches to 
the Study of Experts' Characteristics.” In The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and 
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Situational awareness, although not paradigmatically associated with expertise 
generally, is a skill critical for both effective decision-making and effective 
performance.117  Three types of ability characterize situational awareness:  perception, 
comprehension, and projection.  Each of these is required for the next; perception is 
required for comprehension, and comprehension for projection.  Experts exhibit high-
levels of each of these, but rely most heavily on projection, anticipating the future 
conditions.  Novices, on the other hand, tend to find a challenge with basic perception 
itself, and become, “considerably overloaded in seeking to gather information, 
understand what it means, and formulate correct responses,” and as a result miss critical 
cues required to accurately anticipate likely future states of affairs, which affects the 
quality and speed of decisions the novice makes in the situation.118 
The common explanation among expertise researchers attributes the expert’s 
ability to pick out salient features of the situation, understand their significance, and 
project likely future scenarios to mental models that organize schemata the agent 
                                                                                                                                                 
Expert Performance. ed. Robert R. Hoffman, New York, NY US: Cambridge University 
Press.  Pp. 21-30; and Chi, Michelene T. H., Feltovich, Paul, and Robert Glazer. 1981.  
“Categorization and Representation of Physics Problems by Experts and Novices” in 
Cognitive Science, 5:  121-152; for general use of perceptual language to characterize the 
differences between abilities demonstrated by experts. 
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 Endsley, Mica R. 2006. “Expertise and Situation Awareness.” In The Cambridge 
Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance. ed. Robert R. Hoffman. New York, NY 
US: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 633-651.  P. 634. 
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 Ibid, P. 637. 
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develops with experience.119  The features of situational awareness are crucial to expert-
level performance, as selecting or developing a good strategy for solving a problem 
require accurate perception, comprehension and projection about future states.120  Not 
only do experts develop useful representations, or schemata, to organize the information 
they gain through experience, these schemata are nuanced and highly refined in ways that 
suggest their superior performance relies heavily on them. 
Not only do experts deliberate and choose well, much as the practically wise do, 
but the evidence indicates that there are not young experts in any domains, and that in 
some domains mastery of skills requires decades of intensive study to achieve.121  
Expertise, like practical wisdom, is not an innate quality, or an easily grasped theoretical 
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 For example, studies of expertise in the domain of chess seem to lend support to 
Endsley’s claim regarding the cross-over between the different sorts of expertise with 
respect to situational awareness. 
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 Although, as Endsley mentions, situational awareness is not often named as a crucial 
feature for expertise in other contexts, distinguishing experts from non-experts by their 
demonstrated abilities to quickly and accurately assess the difficulty of a problem, select 
more effective strategies to use in problem-solving, or better qualitative assessment of a 
situation, lend support to this claim (See Chi, Michelene T. H. 2006. “Two Approaches to 
the Study of Experts' Characteristics.” In The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and 
Expert Performance. ed. Robert R. Hoffman, New York, NY US: Cambridge University 
Press.  Pp. 21-30.  P. 23-24). 
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 Ericsson, K. A. 2006. “The Influence of Experience and Deliberate Practice on the 
Development of Superior Expert Performance.” In The Cambridge Handbook of 
Expertise and Expert Performance, ed. Robert R. Hoffman. New York, NY US: 
Cambridge University Press.  Pp. 683-703.  P. 689.  See also Horn, John, and Hiromi 
Masunaga. 2006. “A Merging Theory of Expertise and iIntelligence.” In The Cambridge 
Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance. ed. Robert R. Hoffman. New York, NY 
US: Cambridge University Press.  Pp. 587-611.  P. 602. 
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principle, but requires development over time and across experiences.  Much like the 
rarity of virtue and the right reason of practical wisdom, only very rarely do individuals 
meet the threshold of integrated and refined deliberative ability to be considered virtuous 
or practically wise.  Although domains house many long-standing practitioners, the vast 
majority attain proficiency at the set of skills within the domain, but not the sort of 
exceptionally refined skill that experts attain.122  Further, most individuals who attain an 
expert level of performance do not do so until at least 30 years old, suggesting that it 
parallels practical wisdom in the sense that extensive study and effort is required to attain 
it.123 
These parallels between the classical description of practical wisdom, which can 
be picked out by consistent good choice in activity and is largely adopted on Neo-
Aristotelian virtue accounts, and characterizations of relative expertise in the cognitive 
psychology literature, lend support to the notion that the sorts of skills that underpin 
expert-level performance are self-similar to practical wisdom as excellence in 
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 For example, in the ethics case, although the vast majority of agents are proficient, 
they know what they should do and want to do what they should, they act akratically or 
enkratically, only succeed in part by acting in spite of some motivation to do otherwise.  
Virtue and practical wisdom are rare. 
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601,2;  Ericsson, K.A., 1996. The Road to Excellence: The Acquisition of Expert 
Performance in the Arts and Sciences, Sports, and Games. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
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deliberation about action.  Further, the means by which expertise as mastery develops 
exhibits a strong resemblance to MacIntyrean practices.  In the next section, I survey 
some of the parallels between the development of expertise and the skills developed 
within a practice, and argue that development within domains lends support to the claims 
that practices may be integral to developing practical wisdom. 
Development of Expertise124 
Parallels between descriptions of practical wisdom and the structure of relative 
expertise suggest expertise as a non-moral analogue to practical wisdom, as excellence in 
choice.  If the parallel indicates more than surface similarity, insights from empirical 
evaluation of methods by which relative expertise develops may be useful in better 
understanding how practical wisdom and its rudiments develop.  Further, to the extent 
these methods of developing expertise parallel practices, these studies suggest that 
practices may be a promising means of both direct and indirect action guidance for virtue 
ethics.   
In this section I aim to argue that studies of relative expertise suggest the 
adequacy of practices as means of developing the deliberative skill required for practical 
wisdom, but also supports the claim that practices can provide at least some practical 
guidance to ordinary agents.  Not only does relative expertise share important 
characteristics with practical wisdom, but it is developed within domains, fairly narrowly 
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 I thank Captain Burke Edwards, OBE, for discussing the training regimens of aircraft 
pilots with me, offering me many relevant details of the means by which pilots gain 
flying expertise and maintain their flying skills throughout the course of their licensure. 
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circumscribed areas of study, and share paradigm examples:  chess, sports, music.125  
Like development of practical wisdom, it takes years of practice involving concentrated 
effort and challenges tailored to individual and the situation to realize.  Yet, in addition to 
offering a structure through which agents can develop mastery after many years of study, 
practices offer direct guidance to agents of all levels of accomplishment through mentors, 
coaches, and more-skilled practitioners. 
It is commonly known that it takes about ten years of practice to achieve expert-
level performance.126  Yet, this standard is considered only a general rule of thumb, a 
necessary minimum time commitment to a discipline for achieving expert-level 
peformance.  Further, it is not only participation within a domain over an extended period 
that leads to expert performance, but ten years of deliberate practice.  Deliberate practice 
involves structured study through which agents are faced with ability-appropriate 
incremental challenges which, through meeting these, individuals are able to incorporate 
and eventually master a new skill that allows them to engage in activities that better 
approximate the aims of the discipline.127 
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 It seems that the range of domains studied in the expertise literature, and perhaps 
many of the “informal domains” that are studied under the heading “naturalistic decision-
making”, or not the subject of empirical studies of expertise, would be fall under 
MacIntyre’s definition of practices. 
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 One of the earliest explorations of expertise, Bryan and Harter, 1899, demonstrated 
this, and it has remains a common rule of thumb in describing the development of 
expertise.  Although ten years is somewhat vague, the common assumption is that it 
represents about 10,000 hours of the relevant sort of engagement within the context of the 
domain. 
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In addition to an extended and concentrated effort within a discipline, social 
support of at least three sort plays an integral role in the development of expertise.  As 
MacIntyre’s practices account suggests, institutional accommodations that support the 
domain itself with material structure, equipment, training facilities, yet also establish the 
social structure of the practices by delineating various roles within the institution, roles 
which indicate the responsibilities and aims of the individuals taking on that role.  In 
addition to the material and structural support institutions provide practices and their 
practitioners, institutions indicate a broad-based social support that society expresses in 
developing those institutions and not others.  In addition, there is an extensive amount of 
social support required for an individual to develop expertise, not only does the 
individual require excellent trainers, but studies indicate that the amount of resource 
investment for attaining expert-level performance is so extensive that it is rare for more 
than one child per family to be privy to the sort of resource investment that developing 
expertise requires.128 
                                                                                                                                                 
127In addition to the concentrated effort put forth in deliberate practice, studies of expert 
performance and deliberate practice have found additional domain-specific patterns of 
timing and duration of intense engagement with the discipline (Ericsson, 1993). Although 
perhaps some of the elite and professionals who had much experience, but were not 
picked out by the psychologists as experts or masters in sense needed for the studies to 
get a sort of sketch of expertise characteristics, might be sufficiently capable and 
practiced to be considered very good (and probably indistinguishable from experts by the 
ordinary person).  It might seem excessive to cordon off the elite of the elite, but the 
parallels with practical wisdom and expertise suggest a similar ranking in the ethics 
context. 
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 See Ericsson, K.A. 1996. The Road to Excellence: The Acquisition of Expert 
Performance in the Arts and Sciences, Sports, and Games. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, PP. 18-20. 
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Further, evolving standards of excellence are not only characteristic of practices, 
as MacIntyre defines them, but of expertise development as well.  The trajectory of 
development involves four main stages that correspond with the level of engagement of 
the individual within the practice.  Among the stages observed in the development of 
expert performance abilities, is a stage in which, “individuals go beyond the knowledge 
of their teachers to make a unique innovative contribution to their domain.”129  A look 
across the history of many disciplines offers evidence that, because standards of 
excellence evolve and progress, the innovations are relayed back to other practitioners 
such that they are able to attain levels of achievement with less effort than the pioneering 
performer.  Further, these improvements make it possible, over time, for even merely 
proficient performers to achieve well beyond the accomplishments of past innovating 
experts in the domain.130 
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Conclusion: 
 Practices show promise as a means of implementing the sort of guidance schema 
Hursthouse proposes, by offering them an opportunity to see the point and value of the 
activity they do within the context of a practice and how it relates to virtue.  Further, this 
account gains prima facie empirical support also from studies of expertise and expert 
performance.  Striking parallels between expertise and practical wisdom, and the 
isomorphism between domains in which expertise is honed and practices suggest that 
findings in expertise studies may have bearing on the means by which agents develop 
practical wisdom, or at least the prerequisites of practical wisdom.  Although there may 
not be a single practice through which an agent can become an expert at living well, it 
seems at least prima facie plausible that the sort of deliberative skills developed in the 
course of engaging a practice along the developmental path to expertise, may necessary 
for developing practical wisdom.  
If practical guidance proposals require supplementation to implement, practices 
offer a promising option because they demonstrate to agents within a practice how the 
activities align with and realize the values endorsed within the community and 
incorporated through action.  More than offer action guidance principles or practical 
precepts, practices make evident to novices and ordinary agents the point and value of 
following these precepts.  To do this allows agents to act from right reason, which is 
critical for good activity on a virtue ethics account.  
Because of the promise practices as an implementation method that can 
supplement virtue ethics guidance schemata, I suggest we further explore practices as a 
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promising means of guidance for virtue ethics.  Yet, in order to adopt practices as an 
implementation method we must address a variety of challenges to the account as an 
adequate supplement to plausible virtue ethics guidance schemata.  For example, the 
striking parallels between the phenomena alone do not indicate common cause or identity 
of the phenomena.  Further, it is not immediately clear how the ability to inculcate 
excellence in a narrow domain transfers or generalizes to the realization of virtue.  In 
addition, various puzzles threaten to confound measurement and the use of empirical 
tools to further develop and improve practices.  In the next chapter, I articulate some of 
these challenges, and argue that the ability to bridge the gap of giving point to v-rules and 
action guidance principles makes them worth exploring as an implementation method, 
despite of these obstacles.
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Chapter 4 
Practices:  Questions and Challenges 
Although the empirical evidence detailing the structure of expertise does not 
speak directly to MacIntyre’s account of practices, expertise is honed within the context 
of a domain, which is at least isomorphic with a subset of the practices MacIntyre 
proposes.  If the skills required for expert performance and practical wisdom are 
sufficiently similar, the empirical evidence regarding the development of expertise may 
bear on our understanding of how practices function, their precise role in practical 
guidance, and how they relate to practical wisdom.  Here, I aim to bring these together to 
bring the parallels into sharper resolution, then address some questions and challenges 
that a fully-developed practice-based view of guidance and moral development would 
have to take into account.   
As a means by which to develop virtue in agents and foster activities that reach or 
even exceed the standards of excellence of the activity, the practices of MacIntyre’s 
account offer potential to serve as an implementation method for virtue ethics in ways 
that theory-focused guidance and ideal agency models do not.  Specifically, by 
organizing activities that help agents attain virtue within the context of institutions, more 
skilled practitioners can advise and guide novices or ordinary agents, who comprise at 
least a subset of the group of individuals the practical guidance expectations seem poised 
to serve.  Further, the organized structure of practices and the non-idealized guidance 
from more skilled practitioners suggests practices might be a more empirically adequate 
means of action guidance than either theory-focused guidance or ideal agency models of 
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action guidance.  In addition, the skills and abilities that realizing and advancing the 
standards of excellence, seems to require that an individual engage a practice for an 
extended amount of time, learn by trial and error, and become practiced not only at the 
activities defined and evaluated using the standards of the practice,131 but also at acting 
well by understanding both the aim of the activity and the means by which to achieve that 
aim. 
The activity of meeting the standards of excellence that set the aims of the 
practice comports with the general notion of practical wisdom, the right reason and 
counterpart of virtue.  If practices do develop in practitioners this sort of deliberative 
skill, and excellence in deliberative skill is self-similar to the excellence in the 
deliberation definitive of practical wisdom, then it seems that practices may have an 
important role in developing at least the rudiments of practical wisdom.  If practices have 
this role, it seems that practices may serve not only as an implementation method for 
contemporary virtue ethics, but may also plausibly be a necessary part of a life well lived. 
In lieu of empirical studies designed to evaluate the connection between practices 
and practical wisdom or practices and virtue, studies of expertise and expert performance 
suggest striking parallels between expertise and practical wisdom.  The qualities of 
expertise and expert performance not only describe the sorts of excellences that 
characterize practical wisdom and virtue, excellences in navigating the particulars in 
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 This way of characterizing the aims of a practice are originally from MacIntyre’s  
definition of a practice in After Virtue.  MacIntyre, Alasdair.  1984. After Virtue: A Study 
in Moral Theory. 2nd ed. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 
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order to realize an aim, and the activity of doing this, respectively, but the development 
of expertise parallels the extensive experience and cultivation of habits that practical 
wisdom and virtue require.  Expertise, as exhibited in expert performance, is developed 
over many years’ experience and intensive study within a domain, and the exceptional 
abilities of the expert performers to discern and valuate the relevant particulars and act 
well with respect to the aim they hold, resembles the characteristic features attributed to 
the practically wise and virtuous. 
These parallels suggest an analogue not only between expertise and practical 
wisdom, but these seem to derive from similar sources, domains and practices, 
respectively, suggesting the possibility that these also produce similar sorts of goods for 
agents.  If this analogue highlights relevantly similar features of each, the expertise 
literature suggests that, because expertise develops within domains, and domains share 
striking parallels with practices (particularly in the narrower, more formalized domains 
and practices), practices may be important structures within which practical wisdom is 
honed.  Even if they are not the only place within which one might develop practical 
wisdom, or expertise, it seems that, like domains, practices may have an important, 
although indirect action guiding role for contemporary virtue ethics, but where guidance 
issues from deliberative abilities developed by the individual herself within a practice.  
However, even if practices are worth exploring further as a means of guidance and 
possibly as a necessary component of a life well lived, a series of potential problems with 
practices need to be addressed. 
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 I aim to advance the claim that engaging practices is likely a necessary but far 
from sufficient part of leading a good life.  I argue that although practices are weakly 
normative, alone, they are insufficient for living life well, successfully, or even for 
developing virtue.  In fact, the pervasiveness of practices allows that even the vicious 
could engage practices, acting within complex, socially supported structures wherein 
internal goods could be realized, yet when developed toward the wrong aims, the 
innovations within the structure could prove vicious in the activities, habits, and character 
realized.  Further, although some practices lend themselves to empirical study due to their 
domain-like structure, several issues related to empirical evaluation remain, including 
what can be measured from practices, and the problems of what cannot be measured. 
 Practices demonstrate a striking parallel to domains in which expertise is 
developed and in the previous chapter I have attempted to argue that, because the two 
structures and their end-results share extensive parallels, we should further investigate 
how data evaluating expertise development might better inform us in the work of training 
practical reasoning skills.  Not only do practices account for the training methods, and 
offer an empirically evaluable, and prima facie empirically adequate means of developing 
virtuous qualities and good lives, they are widely accessible even to ordinary agents.  The 
benefits practice-based guidance confers relates to the frame they provide for integrating 
the theoretical commitments of the discipline with conventions and other means to 
accommodate, organize and correct for e.g., tendencies of humans to biases of 
perception, mistakes in reasoning, or combinations thereof. 
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With respect to at least more formal and narrow practices, wherein a clear 
structure and aims of the practice are delineated, we can at least begin, using population-
level studies, to examine whether and to what extent practices can be assessed with 
respect to their role in leading a good life, and which sorts of practices are successful at 
this.  Yet empirical evaluation of practices faces several challenges that need to be met, 
or at least identified, e.g. where methods of empirical evaluation available data obscure 
important, ethically relevant, distinctions, or cannot effectively access the sort of 
information we seek to understand fully the effects of the practice.  Although practices 
offer a more thorough means of guiding agents, including ordinary agents, their role 
within ethical theory needs to be more precisely specified to ensure they are a worthwhile 
alternative to the theory-focused and ideal agency models of practical guidance. 
Corruptions and Bad Practices  
Practices seem plausible as an effective, or at least potentially effective, and 
empirically-responsive means of guidance.  However, practices, as narrowly constrained 
domains that inculcate domain-specific skills seem too narrow to develop virtue, in the 
sense of a robust, stable character trait (and the corresponding robust and refined 
deliberative abilities of the practically wise). Without adequate normative grounding, it 
seems that practices are more likely untenable as means by which individuals can gain 
good guidance or develop the rudiments of practical wisdom or virtue. 
Worse, practices, or what appear to be practices, seem to be at the root of many of 
the most severe human-caused atrocities, so it is important to understand the ways that 
practices fail to foster excellence.  Because practices are only weakly normative, it seems 
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that a view that adopts practice as a central guidance method needs to offer an account of 
bad practices and how they can be avoided.  In addition, it seems that, in parallel to 
expertise and expert performance, even with significant development, one may not 
automatically achieve expert-level performance, and may still fail to consistently 
reconcile the various particulars with the aims in such a way that they are consistently 
met. 
There are at least three main ways that a practice could fail to foster the wellbeing 
of the individual engaging it.  The first way, which I will refer to as a false practice, is a 
practice that that endorses vicious ends instead of virtuous ones.  A second way a practice 
might not help agents realize good ends is by corruptions from within an otherwise good 
practice.  A third way a practice might not lead to good ends, is by engaging a set of 
practices that are mis-prioritized or a combination of practices that cumulatively 
precludes realizing the broader good aims. 
The first way a practice might be considered a bad practice is by being only an 
efficient system of organized technical skills.  Without maintaining the sorts of standards 
of excellence characteristic of MacIntyrean practices, a system that organizes complex 
human activity can run amok.132  Although, according to MacIntyre’s view and definition 
of a ‘practice,’ this set of activities would not count as a practice at all, it seems that from 
outward appearances they would be very difficult to tell from the sorts of practices that 
seem conducive to living well.  Yet, as parallel to the Aristotle’s distinction between 
                                                 
 
132Ibid, esp. 199-201.  
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cleverness and wisdom, e.g. these false practices lack an orientation toward the good, 
which is what makes engaging practices worthwhile and contributes to a life well-lived.  
Although they offer the same sorts of immediate and direct guidance to novices that 
practices might seek, they lack the sorts of dynamic ends that characterize the standards 
of excellence and help define practices, yet this might be difficult to discern until one is 
immersed in the false practice.  Even if they are not considered practices proper, they 
appear as if they are practices and thus pose a danger to practices and the notion that 
practice-based guidance is a good alternative for virtue ethics. 
Corruptions, on the other hand, occur within a practice proper, and are what 
MacIntyre claim is a way that practices might be bad.133  Corruptions to a practice occur 
by having practitioners within the practice who are not virtuous, but vicious, and parallel 
false practices that gain practitioners by mimicking the form of practices, yet lack the 
excellent aim.  Corruptions within practices that occur due to vicious practitioners who 
engage in a practice, but do not share the ends of the virtuous who maintain the integrity 
of the practice, gain benefits from the practices only by the parasitic relationship to the 
virtuous within the practice.   
Corruptions of this sort within a practice, like the technical skills sans good aims 
version of a bad practice, are problematic in part because they may be difficult to 
distinguish from virtuous practitioners.  Further, problematic changes in the activities of 
the practice that these practitioners may make, that is changes that are not true to the 
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defining standards of excellence within a practice, might be difficult to detect.  These 
sorts of changes would be difficult to distinguish from legitimate disagreements that go 
on among practitioners about how best to meet the aims of the practice, or of the sort of 
initial controversy about new methods that often accompany innovative accomplishments 
that further the ends of a practice.  While some innovations may be obvious in their 
nature as furthering the ends of a practice (i.e. the first four-minute mile), legitimate 
disagreements about techniques or means by which to meet a challenge the limits of a 
practice pose may be more subtle and difficult to differentiate from spurious means 
corruptions introduce.  Yet, if the corruptions within a practice are not uprooted, they 
may hinder the advancement of the standards of the practice and the ability of the 
practitioners to live well by engaging the practice.134 
The third possibility for a practice that, by engaging it might thwart, rather than 
promote living well, is not necessarily anything about a particular practice one engages 
that is problematic, but the combination of practices one engages that leads one to fail to 
live well.  As the expertise literature highlights, domains and the goods that are produced 
within them can be quite narrow and the skills developed within them specialized in ways 
that they can be difficult to apply across domains.135  Thus, it seems that to garner the 
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 As automaticity and situationist literature has demonstrated time and again, discerning 
one’s reasoning from within can be a difficult task prone to inaccuracies and distortions 
of various sort. 
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Mechanism for Recalling Several Boards.” Cognitive Psychology 31 (1) (08): 1-40., 
Ericsson, K. A., and A. C. Lehmann. 1996. “Expert and Exceptional Performance: 
 102
breadth of goods that are required to live a life well, one may need to engage in many 
different practices.   
Yet, if there are a variety of practices in which to engage, given resource 
constraints each lives with, it seems that individuals must prioritize practices and manage 
their involvement within their bounds.  In this way, even if an agent engages in good 
practices, how those practices are prioritized with respect to the set of commitments the 
agent espouses may affect the trajectory of his or her life significantly in ways that could 
either conduce to or detract from living well.  Although the variety of practices one might 
engage in leaves the view open to allowing a pluralism of ways an individual might live 
life well, it also allows that individuals might choose to prioritize their practices in ways 
that are ineffective for the purpose of developing the skills needed for living a life well. 
The variety of ways a practice might become bad or corrupted suggests that 
practices need stronger normative grounding than the sort of weak normativity due to the 
natural directionality of practices set by the ends and reinforced by the institutions and 
virtue of the practitioners.  Two sorts of ways that mitigate those conditions such that 
practices might reliably contribute to a life well lived involve providing normative 
grounding both at the individual and the societal levels.  One is suggested by MacIntyre 
to address this issue.  I suggest a second, a sort of empirical grounding, although it does 
                                                                                                                                                 
Evidence of Maximal Adaptation to Task Constraints.” Annual Review of Psychology 47: 
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not directly ground the practice, it shows promise of facilitating normative grounding 
through accurate assessment of practices in relation to the standards. 
Normativity and Practices 
Although practices require virtue and involve standards of excellence as part of 
their structure, it is unclear that these prevent bad action.  Although practices, in part 
because of their reliance on institutions, do have a sort of directionality in the sense that 
they are structured such that the practitioners aim to realize the excellence inherent in the 
activity practices are only weakly normative, and are subject to being corrupted or made 
bad in a variety of ways.  This requires an external normative foundation to maintain the 
integrity of the practice and attain its characteristic excellences. 
 MacIntyre addresses the general issue of the normative grounding of practices by 
situating practices within the context of narrative and tradition, with the aim of making 
intelligible the diversity of aims one might have as they work within the context of 
various practices.  He claims that, 
the narrative phenomenon of embedding is crucial:  the history of a 
practice in our time is generally and characteristically embedded in and 
made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer history of the tradition 
through which the practice in its present form was conveyed to us; the 
history of each of our own lives is generally and characteristically 
 104
embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer 
histories of a number of traditions.136 
 On MacIntyre’s account, activities gain intelligibility within a narrative that connects 
them to an historical context.  To put an activity in such a context helps explain it relative 
to the circumstances that an agent may not choose, but which significantly alter various 
features of one’s life.   
According to MacIntyre, the narrative form reflects the structure of one’s life and 
thus helps us organize and prioritize our practices based on the stories our lives embody.  
However, even with this process, which MacIntyre likens to a Medieval quest, it seems 
that practices are left with arbitrary grounding, with whichever story one chooses to tell.  
To ground these narrative unities in a set of norms of some sort, MacIntyre embeds them 
in cultural-historical traditions, making it possible to evaluate the combination of 
activities and aims with respect to an external set of norms.  
This sort of bookending approach secures the activities of the practices an 
individual engages and their priorities in one’s life, adjudicating among the individual’s 
aims and particularities, the society’s values, and offers a way to normatively ground 
practices.  This approach maintains both the evolutionary nature of the ends of practices 
and the diversity of activities that realizing those ends requires.  In addition to reconciling 
the aims of one’s activities with the encumbrances with which one was born and the 
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expectations of society, the normative foundation of practices might be bolstered by a 
sort of empirical bookending as well. 
For example, one benefit of practice-based guidance is that it is especially 
amenable to population-level assessments because they are structured by institutions that 
make it possible to identify a relevant population to assess.  Although any role in setting 
normative constraints on practices would be indirect, empirical assessment of practices 
could still contribute to developing the normative foundation of practices by assessing the 
trajectory of the effects of practices on their practitioners.  These population-level studies 
make it possible to measure the trajectory of the practice at least along the sort of 
standard well-being markers of social demography.  Yet, although demographic data can 
offer insights into the wellbeing of the group measured, it seems that it remains silent on 
the details of qualities the individuals within the practice have developed, in part because 
of the nature of population-level studies. 
Yet, it seems that there is also a role on the individual end for trait-based 
evaluations or empirical assessments of the well-being of the individuals among 
practices.  Although even these two together ensure neither good practices nor prevent 
corruptions of practices, they can provide an empirical supplement to the sort of value-
based normative grounding of practices that MacIntyre suggests. Further, evaluating 
practices using both population-level and psychological measures may offer insights into 
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the nature and trajectory of the practices that narrative unity grounded within the 
traditions of one’s culture and history may not.137 
Stochastic Skills 
 In part, practice-based guidance is important because it inculcates in practitioners 
the deliberative skills required to interpret situations, deliberate well, and act to realize 
worthwhile aims.  Further, this approach to guidance is empirically adequate because 
various facets of performance can be measured and be evaluated.  However, one concern 
with this purported claim to empirical adequacy is that an important class of failure in 
performance that empirical methods of evaluation may not be able to accommodate 
presents a significant obstacle to accurate empirical assessment of a practice. 
Stochastic skill, a Stoic notion captures the sort of failure in performance that 
presents a challenge to accurate empirical assessment of a practice.  As Julia Annas 
characterizes them, they are, “skills in which a failure, because of contingencies, to 
achieve the outcome is different from a failure in the exercise of the skill itself.”138  If it is 
possible to gain the goods of an activity without the outward signs of success, then it is 
unclear to what extent we might be able to effectively measure the success of practices.  
                                                 
 
137Social demography assessments of practices are an example of the sort of population 
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With respect to this sort of skill in rhetoric and the example of medicine, Aristotle 
claims that, 
It is clear, further, that its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, 
but rather to discover the persuasive facts in each case.  In this it 
resembles all other arts.  For example, it is not the function of medicine 
simply to make a man healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the path 
to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can 
never enjoy sound health.139 
While it seems possible for an individual to deliberate and act the right way within a 
practice and yet remain unsuccessful at it, it seems unlikely, given the nature of experts’ 
carefully-honed abilities that no indicators of their excellence would be evident, even if 
conditions made it impossible to realize the aim of the activity.   
For example, because expert deliberators have engaged the particulars and the 
ends extensively, at least within their specific domain, they may still be able to indicate 
their expertise, even if they cannot meet the aim and haven’t yet solved the puzzle of how 
to meet this goal.  Because one of the main differences between experts and non-experts 
is that experts have catalogued many situations and their assessment of how they relate to 
various aims within the domain, and organized them in their own conceptual framework 
in order to understand how the particulars fit with the universals, they may be better 
                                                 
 
139
 Aristotle. 1984. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. 
Translated by Jonathan Barnes.  Bollingen Series.  Vol. 71, 2. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 1355b9-15 
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equipped to make sense of the gap between the exercise of the skill and the unmet aim.  
Or, the individual might be able to identify what else needs to go right in order to succeed 
in meeting the aim, in the way the physician in Aristotle’s example is able to see that, 
even with excellent treatment, the aim of robust health will not be met due to the 
condition of the patient.  Or, even if the expert does not see what is going wrong clearly, 
expertise allows the expert to pick out several things that are going right, at least relative 
to the framework that he or she usually adheres to.   
If the internal goods of the activity can be obtained without success in meeting an 
externally evident aim, it seems that the problem for empirical evaluation of practices that 
develop these sorts of skills may be entrenched.140  In addition, it seems, that the issue of 
discerning skill in these situations is further complicated by whether or not the expert 
recognizes the conditions as precluding the realization of the aim.  In one case, the 
exercise of a stochastic skill need not be problematic in the sense that the goal is not met, 
yet the expert recognizes the conditions as precluding the realization of the aim.  
However, if the expert does not recognize that the conditions are precluding the 
                                                 
 
140
 It seems likely that there are cases wherein the internal goods derived through 
exercising the skill prevent the agent from attempting to meet the aim toward which the 
skill is typically directed.  Aristotle’s example seems to fit this characterization.  
Although the aim of medicine is to foster excellent health, the physician recognizes that 
the condition of the patient is such that robust health will never be attained, yet the reality 
of the situation does not bear on the excellence in skill the physician exercises in treating 
a frail patient. 
This seems evident when we consider expert-level competition as well.  If two 
chess grandmasters, e.g. are playing against one another, at least one will not reach the 
aim of winning the game.  However, because of the challenges that are involved in 
playing the game, it seems that even non-winners in the game can benefit from the 
internal goods produced. 
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realization of the aim, it seems that it is a failure of skill in this case.141  If it is unclear 
from the realization of the aim whether the expert is exercising their skill or just mistaken 
in her assessment of the situation, it seems nearly impossible to accurately assess 
effectiveness of practices to produce expertise.   
 Among the purported benefits of endorsing a practice-based guidance view is that 
practices provide a structure that is empirically evaluable in ways that the structure the 
ideal agency model, for example, is not.  However, it seems possible that an agent could 
engage in deliberate practice for a period of time extensive enough to develop the sorts of 
skills indicative of expertise and expert performance, yet be in immersed in 
circumstances wherein he would fail to realize the aim of the practice, the aims which he 
has trained extensively to realize.  If measurability requires these effects, and it is 
possible for agents to have skills that are definitive of expertise or practical wisdom, yet 
not express them outwardly, or do so inconsistently due to variations in the 
circumstances, the conclusions that we can draw from the empirical studies might be 
relatively narrow.   
                                                 
141
 E.g. Among the limits of expertise and expert performance, Chi notes that there are 
situations in which experts perform less well than novices in circumstances that 
differ significantly from those of the domain.  When the differences in the 
circumstances go unrecognized by the expert and the expert attempts to apply their 
domain-specific knowledge in these contexts, it can lead to poorer performance than 
even the novice assessments of the scenarios and performance on these tasks.  Chi, 
Michelene T. H. 2006. “Two Approaches to the Study of Experts' Characteristics.” 
In The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance. ed. Robert R. 
Hoffman, New York, NY US: Cambridge University Press.  Pp. 21-30.  
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Stochastic skills pose a significant problem for empirical assessment of expert 
skill and virtue both because it separates the exercise of the skill or virtue from the 
realization of the aim.  We cannot measure the exercise of the skill in cases where the 
expert recognizes the confounding conditions and is exercising the skill knowing that he 
will not realize the aim.  Yet, this may be virtually indistinguishable from the situation 
where the aim is confounded and the expert does not realize this, resulting in a failure of 
skill.  However, that we cannot assess empirically skill under these conditions does not 
tell against practice-based guidance as empirically adequate.  Instead, it highlights a 
weakness in the tools we have available to assess these skills.   
Pitfalls and Promise of Practice-Based Guidance 
 As a guidance method for virtue ethics, practices seem to be a prima facie 
empirically adequate implementation means of developing in agents the skills needed for 
practical wisdom and virtue.  However, because practices are only weakly normative, 
they are vulnerable to corruptions both internally and externally, from corrupted aims and 
agents to poor combinations of practices, respectively.  Further, if there are stochastic 
skills that can be exercised without successfully realizing their aims, the ability to assess 
the skill of the practitioners may be threatened. 
 These problems require that corruptions that may plague practices need to be 
mitigated by normative and empirical grounding.  Further, the inability to distinguish 
among practitioners whose skill is not outwardly evident may confound some empirical 
assessment of the effectiveness of the means by which a practice guides or inculcates the 
skills necessary for good deliberation.  Yet, the benefits of practices outweigh these 
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drawbacks, offering agents not only direct guidance, but indirect forms that allow 
individuals to realize goods that derive from the activity itself.   
 Even though practices lack the normative grounding to stand alone as a means to 
living well, to developing practical wisdom, and virtue, it seems that there are still good 
reasons for contemporary virtue ethics to adopt practice-based guidance in lieu of the 
sorts of theory-focused alternatives, as a means of addressing the problems identified by 
practical guidance objections.  Where ideal agency models and theory-focused guidance 
leave ordinary agents without a means of making sense of the particulars in light of their 
aims, practices are able to order subsidiary aims such that this is possible for agents of all 
skill level within the broader pursuit.  Plus, it seems that if we are to consider the benefits 
of practices again as a guidance method, it seems that there is a sense in which not only 
are they more effective and empirically adequate than the competing views, it seems that 
there are goods to be gained by engaging the practice itself, making it an important, if not 
necessary component of a life well lived. 
Conclusion 
Practices appear sufficiently analogous to expertise that they offer a structure for 
integrating both general and far-reaching aims, and also procure a parallel end result, 
expertise or expert deliberative abilities.  Because of these parallels and common 
foundation, we have prima facie reason to adopt a practice-based ethics in lieu of 
developing guidance for virtue ethics built around adhering to principled codes or ideal 
agency models alone.  However, the account must address a substantial series of 
challenges to prove the view viable because the precise nature of practices and how they 
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function requires a more detailed description of their role in developing virtues and a life 
well lived.  To justify developing practices as a supplement to other guidance schemata 
as standard means by which virtue ethics meet practical guidance expectations, we must 
first address the challenges to the view. 
The main critiques of practices imply both that practices require further 
grounding, both socially and individually, and that our understanding of the limits and 
interactions among practices will require both more empirical and theoretical work to 
bring the precise role of practices into sharper relief.  Two features of practice-based 
guidance suggest that practices are especially worth exploring further, in spite of these 
challenges.  One is the striking parallels between practical wisdom and practices with 
expertise and its development respectively.  The other is that the gap that remains 
between proposals for guidance, such as Hursthouse’s, and the legitimate concern of the 
practical guidance objection that ethical theory should aims influence action, suggest it is 
worthwhile to consider practices as a promising way contemporary virtue ethics can 
provide adequate guidance that is both empirically adequate and falls within the bounds 
of the theory’s traditional constraints. 
As a promising means of guiding even ordinary agents, I have aimed to develop a 
case to support the claim that we should explore the role of practices as a means of 
implementing action guidance for agents on a character-based account.  Although they 
are incomplete in the sense of providing a comprehensive picture of the good life, 
practices make manifest the point of the activity and demonstrate the way the activity 
realizes the value.  An account of practices shows the promise of providing us a structure 
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through which we can better approximate excellence by incorporating the point and 
purpose of mundane activities that are the building blocks of virtue.  In their parallels 
with expertise and the environments in which it is developed, practices appear to be not 
only a plausible alternative to the sort of standards approaches to action guidance and 
meet the moderate practical guidance expectations, but are plausibly a necessary part of a 
life well lived. Although developing an account of practices is not without obstacles, they 
address the version of the practical guidance objection that gets purchase against virtue 
ethics, and are worth exploring further as a means of practical guidance.
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